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Trade Secrets Law and Corporate Disclosure: Causal Evidence on the 
Proprietary Cost Hypothesis 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study exploits the staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by U.S. 
state courts as an exogenous shock that generates variations in the proprietary costs of 
disclosure. We find that firms respond to IDD adoption by reducing the level of disclosure 
regarding their customers’ identities, supporting the proprietary cost hypothesis. Our results 
are stronger for firms in industries with a higher degree of entry threats, for firms in more 
volatile industries, and for firms with a lower degree of external financing dependence. 
Overall, this study represents one of the first efforts in identifying the causal effect of 
proprietary costs of disclosure on the supply of disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Proprietary costs, corporate disclosure, customer identity, inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, trade secrets law 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, 
which may increase a firm’s stock liquidity and decrease its cost of capital. Thus, absent any 
costs, value-maximizing managers have incentives to fully disclose their private information. 
Full disclosure, however, is rarely observed in the capital market. One potential constraint 
to full disclosure is that some disclosures may damage a firm’s competitive position in its 
product market. Verrecchia [1983] shows that in the presence of proprietary costs, partial 
disclosure can be optimal, with the level of disclosure decreasing in the proprietary costs of 
disclosure. 
In this study, we seek to provide causal evidence on the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
Although the impact of proprietary costs of disclosure on the decision to disclose proprietary 
information is theoretically unambiguous, the empirical literature to date fails to provide 
conclusive evidence on the proprietary cost hypothesis, possibly because of the following 
challenges (Berger [2011]). 1  First, the proprietary costs of disclosure are generally 
unobservable to researchers and thus researchers often have to use industry structure to 
approximate variations in proprietary costs. The relation between industry structure and 
proprietary costs, however, is theoretically ambiguous. For example, product market 
concentration can be either positively or negatively correlated with proprietary costs of 
disclosure, depending on whether firms face existing competitors or the threat of entry, and 
on whether firms compete primarily on the basis of price or long-run capacity decisions (e.g., 
Clinch and Verrecchia [1997]; Darrough [1993]; Darrough and Stoughton [1990]; Dye [1998]; 
Gigler et al. [1994]; Penno [1997]; Verrecchia [1990a,b]; Wagenhofer [1990]). This theoretical 
issue is further complicated by measurement errors in industry structures (e.g., Ali et al. 
                                                          
1 See Section 2.3 for a detailed review of the empirical literature on proprietary costs of disclosure. 
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[2009]; Berger and Hann [2007]; Dedman and Lennox [2009]). For example, Ali et al. [2009] 
demonstrate that using industry concentration measures from the Census (including both 
private and public firms) overturns many results of previous literature using Compustat 
concentration measures. 
Second, measures of proprietary costs of disclosure (such as industry structure) may 
actually capture omitted capital market benefits and agency costs of disclosure. As one 
example, industry structure measures are often influenced by the number of firms in an 
industry. The greater the number of firms, the lower are firms’ capital market benefits 
associated with their own disclosure, because capital market participants learn from 
information spillovers provided by related firms.2  Thus, it is unclear whether the relation 
between high competition (measured by low concentration) and low disclosure is due to high 
proprietary costs or low capital market benefits. Segment disclosure is another context in 
which proprietary costs, capital market benefits, and agency costs are complicatedly 
entwined. It is often argued that managers do not disclose segment information to hide highly 
profitable segments for proprietary cost motives (Berger and Hann [2007]).3 However, given 
that the average profitability is publically available in the income statement, managers must 
also hide some unprofitable segments, or otherwise the reported average profitability will 
reveal the truth (Leuz [2004]). Thus, it is possible that managers are in fact hiding 
unprofitable segments through non-disclosure to avoid shareholder scrutiny and enjoy a 
quiet life or to maintain the level of stock prices.4 From these examples, we can see that it is 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer [2000], Baginski and Hinson [2016], Shroff, Verdi, and 
Yost [2016], Breuer, Hombach, and Müller [2016], Berger, Minnis, and Sutherland [2017]. 
3 Managers also claim that they “do not want to explicitly reveal sensitive proprietary information 
‘on a platter’ to competitors, even if such information could be partially inferred by competitors from 
other sources, such as trade journals or trade conferences” (Graham et al. [2005]: 62). 
4 Cho [2015] finds that more transparent segment disclosure is associated with less severe agency 
problems and higher investment efficiency. 
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difficult to disentangle the effects of proprietary costs, agency costs, and capital market 
benefits on disclosure choices. A related challenge plaguing this literature is that the 
information disclosed by firms is often not merely or not even majorly relevant for competitors. 
For instance, while management earnings forecasts are informative to investors, it is unclear 
what specific competitive advantage a firm sacrifices in disclosing earnings forecasts shortly 
before the actual earnings announcements (Lang and Sul [2014]). 
We strive to address these challenges using a research design with two key features. 
Firstly, we exploit a trade secrets law setting that provides plausibly exogenous shifts in the 
proprietary costs of disclosure, holding other determinants of disclosure approximately fixed. 
Unlike most studies in the prior literature, this setting does not rely on the theory and 
measurement of industry structure. Secondly, we investigate a disclosure item that is 
unambiguously known to the firm and is primarily more relevant to competitors than to other 
stakeholders. This feature further helps mitigate concerns about correlated omitted variables 
related to agency costs or capital market benefits of disclosure.5  
Specifically, our empirical strategy is based on the staggered adoption of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts since the 1970s (Klasa et al. [2017]). The IDD 
is a theory in trade secrets law that grants the employer (i.e., the plaintiff) an injunction to 
prevent a current or former employee (i.e., the defendant) from working for another company, 
if the employer demonstrates that the employee will inevitably disclose the employer’s trade 
secrets in the performance of the employee’s new position. According to the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition (1995: 39), a trade secret is “any information that can be used 
in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret 
                                                          
5 This exercise is in the spirit of Leuz [2004], which distinguishes between disclosures that are more 
likely to be proprietary and those that are more relevant to capital markets. The author looks at cash 
flow statements, which are likely not proprietary but relevant to capital markets. 
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to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” Examples of trade secrets 
include customer lists, a method of production, or a secret formula for a soft drink.6 The IDD 
applies to every employee and every business secret of a firm and it does not require evidence 
of actual or even threatened misappropriation. Thus, adoption of the IDD essentially blocks 
one of the most important channels through which a firm’s rivals can obtain its confidential 
information. 
We argue that adoption of the IDD helps generate exogenous variations in a firm’s 
proprietary costs of disclosure. First, the IDD increases a firm’s proprietary costs of disclosure 
by increasing the marginal value of disclosure to its rivals through a substitution channel. 
That is, with less access to trade secrets via employees’ job switching, rival firms would rely 
more heavily on a firm’s public disclosures in discovering its proprietary information. Second, 
for information to be protectable under trade secrets laws (including the IDD), it must not be 
readily ascertainable by proper means by persons who could obtain economic value from its 
use. For example, once a firm discloses a piece of information, such as customer lists, in its 
financial reports, the information loses its trade secret status.7 Thus, to take advantage of 
the protection offered by the IDD, firms must not disclose their proprietary information to 
the capital markets, because such disclosure essentially makes the information less 
protectable by the IDD in the product market. 8  Put another way, adoption of the IDD 
increases the marginal benefits of non-disclosure. Based on these arguments, we predict that 
firms disclose less in response to adoption of the IDD. 
                                                          
6 See, for example, ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952,959 (7th Cir. 2006). 
7 Trade secrets are different from patents. In the case of patents, the firm needs to disclose the 
confidential information in exchange for patent protection for a finite period of time. 
8 As suggested by Quinto and Singer [2014], an important defense for a trade secret 
misappropriation is to provide evidence that the plaintiff’s trade secret could be obtained from public 
sources without significant costs.  
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An important consideration in testing the proprietary cost hypothesis is “to identify 
disclosure choices which impose significant costs on the firm in terms of its competitive 
environment” (Lang and Sul [2014]: 272). In this study, we focus on a firm’s disclosure choices 
about its customers (Ellis et al. [2012]). Specifically, we examine how adoption of the IDD 
impacts a firm’s decision to disclose the identity of its important customers. Information 
about customers can help investors to assess the level and volatility of a firm’s current and 
future revenues (e.g., Fee et al. [2006], Dhaliwal et al. [2015]). The same information, 
however, is also of obvious value to the firm’s current and potential product market rivals in 
competing with the firm for market share. Moreover, a 2002 survey conducted by ASIS 
International (thereafter, the ASIS survey) shows that the most frequent type of proprietary 
information loss incident involves customer-related information, including customer identity, 
preferences, and pricing.9 Thus, we argue that disclosure choice regarding customer identity 
is an ideal proxy for proprietary information disclosure for our research question. As 
discussed by Ellis et al. [2012], an important feature of this disclosure proxy is that we can 
ascertain that the information in question (i.e., the identity of customers) exists, whereas in 
other contexts, such as in the case of management forecasts, it is often unclear whether non-
disclosure reflects managerial choices or the fact that the firm has no information to disclose. 
This feature helps mitigate the concerns that non-disclosure is driven by agency costs because 
it is difficult for managers to hide the information for agency cost reasons when investors can 
ascertain managerial endowment of such information (Dye [1985]; Jung and Kwon [1988]).  
Using a panel of 28,547 U.S. firms over the 1994–2010 period and a difference-in-
differences (DiD) method, we find that firms headquartered in states that adopt the IDD 
                                                          
9 The report is available at 
https://foundation.asisonline.org/FoundationResearch/Publications/Documents/trendsinproprietaryin
formationloss.pdf. 
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significantly reduce the level of disclosure regarding their customers’ identities, by 
approximately 7% to 9% after the IDD is adopted, relative to firms headquartered in states 
that do not adopt the IDD. In the regression model, we control for standard time-varying 
firm-, industry-, and state-level characteristics that potentially influence the level of a firm’s 
disclosure. We also include state, industry, and year indicators to control for time-invariant, 
unobservable state and industry characteristics, as well as economy-wide shocks. The results 
are also robust to controlling for time-invariant, unobservable firm characteristics through 
inclusion of firm fixed effects. In dynamic analysis, we find that the decreases in disclosure 
mainly occur in one or two years after the adoption of the IDD, but not before. 
In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of the IDD on the concealment of 
customer identities is statistically and economically more pronounced for firms in industries 
with a higher degree of entry threats and industries with more volatile sales, suggesting that 
it is more costly to lose trade secrets for these firms. On the other hand, the effect of the IDD 
on the concealment of customer information is significantly weaker when the firm exhibits a 
higher level of external financing dependence, suggesting that capital market benefits of 
disclosure mitigate the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure. Overall, the cross-sectional results 
provide further support for the causal effect of the IDD on disclosure of customer identities. 
The IDD of a firm’s home state can be applicable even if an employee is moving to a 
rival located in another state (Klasa et al. [2017]). However, using a firm’s headquarters-
state’s IDD adoption to measure the firm’s overall exposure to the IDD can still be 
problematic for multi-state firms. In robustness tests, we address this issue in two ways. 
First, we restrict our sample to firms with a majority of their employees working in the 
headquarters states. Second, we estimate a weighted-measure of IDD exposure that takes 
into account the number of employees in each state in which the firm has subsidiaries or 
branches. Our results are robust to both methods. 
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To remove the effects of unobserved variation in local conditions, we exploit the 
geographic richness of our data to sharpen our identification. Assuming that the 
developments of the economic conditions are similar in neighboring states, we can difference 
away unobservable changes in local conditions by comparing firms in each adopting state 
with their peers in neighboring, non-adopting states. Using control firms from immediate 
neighbors and shared-border fixed effects, we find that the effect of the IDD on disclosure 
continues to be significant, implying that unobserved local confounding effects are unlikely 
to be the main drivers of our results. Further, we conduct a placebo test in which we randomly 
assign the adoption (rejection) date to each IDD adopting (rejecting) state and re-estimate 
the effect of these pseudo-IDD adoptions (rejections) on firms’ disclosure of customer 
identities. We repeat this exercise 1,000 times and plot the probability density function of the 
placebo coefficients. The results reveal that such random assignments are associated with an 
insignificant effect on customer information disclosure. These analyses suggest that our main 
finding is unlikely to be driven by un-modelled factors. Finally, to maximize state-level 
variations, we collapse firm-year observations into state-year observations. The results 
continue to hold in state-year level regressions. 
Our study contributes to the financial reporting and disclosure literature by 
identifying the causal effect of proprietary costs on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. The 
effect has been elusive because of the difficulties in separating agency and proprietary cost 
reasons of disclosure. Our study exploits IDD adoptions that generate exogenous shifts in the 
proprietary costs of disclosure. Moreover, we examine a disclosure item that is 
unambiguously known to the firm and is majorly useful to competitors than to other 
stakeholders. The information under our consideration, customer identity, is clearly 
proprietary in nature, and its revelation can significantly erode a firm’s competitive 
advantages, compared to disclosure measures used in prior research. This study also relates 
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to the broad literature on how law affects corporate policies, particularly financial reporting 
and disclosure policies. Prior literature generally focuses on laws that provide protection for 
investors or creditors (e.g., La Porta et al. [1998], Leuz et al. [2003], Cohen et al. [2008]). Our 
research advances this literature by examining how intellectual property and labor laws 
affect corporate disclosure. Finally, our study is related to the study of Klasa et al. [2017], 
which examines the effect of the IDD on financial leverage. We note, however, that our 
inferences are unaltered even after we control for the leverage effect of the IDD.10 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal 
background of the IDD, reviews related literature on the proprietary cost hypothesis, and 
presents our empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the data and variable measurements. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results and cross-sectional analyses. Section 5 
discusses additional tests and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 sets forth our conclusions. 
 
2. Trade Secrets Law, the IDD, and Proprietary Costs of Disclosure 
2.1 THE IDD 
According to the ASIS survey, U.S. companies likely experience proprietary 
information and intellectual property losses of more than $50 billion each year. The survey 
also reports that the most frequent types of incidents are losses of trade secrets related to a 
firm’s customers, strategy plans, and financial data. In addition, the survey reveals that 
deliberate actions of current and former employees are a primary threat to proprietary 
information. In the civil arena, protection of trade secrets in the U.S. is provided for almost 
exclusively under state law. Historically, trade secrets law has evolved as common law, which 
is the accumulation of precedents set by decisions of courts in previous cases. In 1979, the 
                                                          
10 Our results are also robust to controlling for other potential confounds, such as investment and 
financing activities. 
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (UTSA) and recommended it for enactment in all states. By 2014, 48 states, 
Washington D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands had adopted either the 1979 version of the 
UTSA or the 1985 amended version of the UTSA. The exceptions are Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, New York, and Texas. Under Section 2 of the UTSA, the owner of a trade secret 
can obtain injunctive relief to prevent actual or threatened misappropriation. 
Misappropriation means disclosure or use of a trade secret by the defendant to the plaintiff’s 
detriment. 
The IDD is a theory of common law that substantially enhances protection of trade 
secrets. Trade secrets misappropriation is seen as inevitable if an employee with knowledge 
of a firm’s trade secrets accepts an equivalent position with a competitor of the firm. In such 
a situation, the employee who wants to do good work will inevitably rely on all information 
or knowledge she has, including her former employer’s trade secrets. State courts that 
recognize the IDD can grant temporary injunctive relief (in rare cases, a permanent 
injunction) to the plaintiff firm to prevent the employee from working for the new employer. 
Thus, the IDD reduces incidents of actual or threatened disclosure or uses of trade secrets by 
departing employees and significantly enlarges protection of confidential information. 
Note that the IDD is an independent common law theory from the statutory law of 
UTSA in the sense that recognition of the IDD by state courts does not require adoption of 
the UTSA in the state and that adoption of the UTSA does not imply recognition of the IDD. 
To obtain relief under Section 2 of the UTSA, the employer needs to prove that the former 
employee has actually misappropriated the trade secret (e.g., the former employee has used 
the trade secret at the disadvantage of the plaintiff) or is threatening to misappropriate it 
(e.g., the former employee has bad faith intention to disclose the trade secret to the competing 
firm), whereas under the IDD, evidence for actual or threatened misappropriation is not 
11 
 
required for obtaining injunctive relief (Quinto and Singer [2014], Png and Samila [2015]). 
The UTSA requires the firm to establish actual wrongdoing by the employee, such as 
disclosure or misappropriation of trade secrets or bad faith. Under the IDD, the plaintiff only 
needs to show that the employee would be employed in such a capacity that she would 
“inevitably” disclose the trade secrets. As a result, a substantial advantage of the IDD is that 
firms can take actions to prevent the harm before the harm is done, whereas under the UTSA 
the firm normally can only act after the harm has already been done. 
Despite its long existence, the IDD appears to be more seriously recognized and 
practiced only after the prominent case of PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond (the PepsiCo case). In 
1994, there was fierce competition between PepsiCo Inc. and Quaker Oats Company in the 
“sports drinks” and “new age drinks” markets. Both companies saw 1995 as an important 
year for their products. William Redmond worked for PepsiCo from 1984 to 1994 and was 
promoted to general manager of the California business unit in 1994. The position gave 
Redmond access to PepsiCo’s strategic and annual operating plans, which included 
information concerning pricing, customers, and new delivery systems. On November 8, 1994, 
Redmond accepted a position with Quaker as its Vice President–Field Operations for its 
Gatorade division. On November 16, 1994, PepsiCo filed a suit in District Court in the State 
of Illinois, seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin Redmond from assuming his 
duties at Quaker and to prevent him from disclosing trade secrets or confidential information 
to his new employer. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order enjoining Redmond from 
assuming his responsibilities at Quaker for six months, and permanently barred him from 
disclosing PepsiCo’s trade secrets and confidential information. As summarized by the Court 
of Appeals: 
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Having shown Redmond’s intimate knowledge of [PepsiCo’s] plans for 1995, 
PepsiCo argued that Redmond would inevitably disclose that information to 
Quaker in his new position, at which he would have substantial input as to 
Gatorade and Snapple pricing, costs, margins, distribution systems, products, 
packaging and marketing, and could give Quaker an unfair advantage in its 
upcoming skirmishes with PepsiCo.11 
 
Since 1995, the PepsiCo case has been widely followed by other state courts. 12 
According to data assembled by Klasa et al. [2017], 10 out of 21 states whose courts adopted 
the IDD ruled on the doctrine in the years after 1995. As in Klasa et al. [2017], we argue that 
adoption of the IDD is exogenous to the economic conditions of firms and their headquarters 
states because of the common law nature of the doctrine. Recognition of the IDD prompted 
by the PepsiCo case is even more likely to be exogenous to the adopting states’ business and 
economic activities given that the precedent set by the PepsiCo case only applies in Illinois. 
 
2.2 IMPACT OF THE IDD ON DISCLOSURE 
The equilibrium level of disclosure for a firm results from its manager’s tradeoff 
between the benefits and costs of disclosure. In this paper, we argue that adoption of the IDD 
represents an exogenous shock that increases the marginal costs of proprietary information 
disclosure and the marginal benefits of non-disclosure. As discussed in the Section 2.1, an 
important channel for a firm’s competitor to learn about the firm’s proprietary information 
is to hire the firm’s departing employees who have access to such information. Adoption of 
the IDD reduces the risk that a firm loses its confidential information to its rivals through 
employee movements. Two related effects follow. First, with less access to trade secrets via 
employees’ job switching, rival firms will rely more heavily on a firm’s public disclosures in 
discovering its proprietary information. This “substitution” effect increases the marginal cost 
                                                          
11 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3rd 1262 (7th Cir, 1995). 
12 Note, however, that the PepsiCo case is not the precedent-setting case for Illinois. 
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of disclosure for the firm, because the disclosure is now more valuable to its rivals. Second, 
the stronger legal protection of trade secrets essentially increases the economic value of 
proprietary information by increasing the “property rights” of a firm over its proprietary 
information. This effect also increases the proprietary costs of disclosure, because the 
disclosed information is of higher economic value to the disclosing firm under the protection 
of the IDD. 
Virtually any type of information is potentially protectable under the IDD. However, 
for a piece of information to be protectable, the holder of the information should try to keep 
it secret such that the only way the secret can be unmasked is via unlawful activities. As 
explained by the Iowa Supreme Court: “There is virtually no category of information that 
cannot, as long as the information is protected from disclosure to the public, constitute a trade 
secret.”13 Thus, adoption of the IDD increases the opportunity cost of public disclosure or the 
marginal benefit of non-disclosure, because public disclosure of proprietary information 
makes the information non-protectable under the IDD. Based on the above arguments, we 
predict that adoption of the IDD decreases the level of proprietary information disclosure, 
because it increases the marginal cost (marginal benefit) of disclosure (non-disclosure).  
 
2.3 RELATED LITERATURE 
Our study is related to the literature on testing the proprietary cost hypothesis of 
disclosure. To approximate variation in proprietary costs, prior literature has mainly 
resorted to variation in industry structure. Such variation has been used to explain voluntary 
disclosures of information that is useful for multiple stakeholders. For example, Harris [1998] 
argues that firms disclose less information about their operations in less competitive 
                                                          
13 Economy Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Iowa 1995). 
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industries to protect the abnormal profits of these operations. Consistent with this argument, 
she finds that operations with slower rates of abnormal profit adjustment and higher market 
share concentration are less likely to be reported as industry segments. Consistent with 
Harris [1998], Bens et al. [2011] find that the industry speed of abnormal profit adjustment 
is negatively related to the probability of aggregation in segment disclosures for firms with 
value-enhancing diversification. Using a German setting, Leuz [2004] finds that firms are 
more likely to voluntarily provide segment data when entry barriers are relatively high and 
when firm profitability is low. In addition, firms having more heterogeneous segment profits 
in their mandatory reports (implying that the reported average profitability in the income 
statement is less informative) are less likely to provide segment data when reporting is still 
voluntary. Botosan and Stanford [2006] find that firms use the latitude afforded by 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 to hide profitable segments operating 
in less competitive industries. In contrast, Berger and Hann [2007] do not find evidence that 
proprietary costs affect disclosure of profitable segments. Using a survey-based measure of 
competition, Dedman and Lennox [2009] show that managers are more likely to withhold 
information about sales and costs of sales if they perceive that current or potential 
competition is strong. 
Verrecchia and Weber [2006] find that firms in more competitive industries are more 
likely to redact information in their financial reports. Similarly, Li [2010] shows that firms 
in more competitive industries are less likely to provide management forecasts. Boone et al. 
[2016] show that initial public offering (IPO) firms with higher R&D expenditures and in 
more competitive product markets are more likely to redact information from their Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration filings. On the other hand, Bamber and Cheon 
[1998] find that firms in more concentrated industries issue less precise earnings forecasts. 
Ali et al. [2014] attribute the mixed findings of the prior research to errors in measuring 
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industry concentration using Compustat data. Using a refined measure of industry 
concentration that takes into account private firms, these authors show that manufacturing 
firms in more concentrated industries disclose less due to proprietary costs of disclosure.  
Our study differs from prior research in that we do not rely on theory and empirical 
measures of industry structure in testing the proprietary cost hypothesis. Instead, we exploit 
events that generate plausibly exogenous variations in the marginal proprietary costs of 
disclosure through a substitution channel (i.e., a rival’s choice of obtaining confidential 
information through the firm’s public disclosure versus through hiring the firm’s employees). 
Therefore, our study can provide an assessment on the magnitude of the elasticity of 
proprietary information supply with respect to proprietary costs of disclosure.  
Our identification is further strengthened by investigating a disclosure item, namely, 
customer identity, which is unambiguously known to the firm and is relatively more useful 
to competitors than to other stakeholders. Our focus on disclosure of customer identity is 
closely related to the study of Ellis et al. [2012], who first examine comprehensively the 
determinants of customer information disclosure. These authors show that firms with more 
R&D and advertising expenses tend to disclose less information about their customers, 
consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. Again, our contribution over Ellis et al. [2012] 
lies in the identification of the causal effect of proprietary costs on voluntary disclosure. Lack 
of identification generally leads to alternative interpretations, and thus documenting causal 
effects and the associated elasticities are pivotal for empirically testing theories (Leuz and 
Wysocki [2016]). 
Our study is also closely related to concurrent research by Aobdia [2017]. Similar to 
our study, Aobdia [2017] argues that noncompete agreements increase proprietary costs of 
disclosure because these agreements reduce information leakage through employee 
movements. Using a time-invariant enforcement index constructed by Garmaise [2011], 
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Aobdia [2017] finds a negative association between a state’s propensity to enforce noncompete 
agreements and disclosure activities (e.g., management forecasts) of firms headquartered in 
this state. As discussed earlier, the advantage of our research lies in the research design: the 
use of a plausibly exogenous shock to proprietary costs of disclosure and a disclosure item 
that better captures proprietary information.14 Moreover, the IDD arguably provides much 
stronger and far-reaching protection of trade secrets than noncompete agreements. As noted 
by Garmaise [2011], noncompete agreements are mostly effective when workers seek to 
switch jobs within a state.           
Finally, our study is related to the emerging literature on the effect of the IDD on 
corporate policies. Klasa et al. [2017] argue that the risk of losing intellectual property to 
rivals is an important competitive threat and the adoption of the IDD in a firm’s home state 
reduces such a risk. They find that firms rebalance the capital structure and increase 
financial leverage after the IDD adoption, consistent with the idea that decreased competitive 
threat induces firms to choose less conservative capital structures. Our study extends this 
literature by examining the effect of the IDD adoption on corporate disclosure policies.  
 
3. Data 
3.1 SAMPLE 
Our sample begins with all firm–year observations in the 10-K Headers Database 
constructed by Bill McDonald.15  The database provides information about the historical 
                                                          
14  In practice, effective enforcement of noncompete agreements requires the firm to have 
employment contracts with such agreements. This can introduce an additional selection problem in 
the research design. In contrast, the impact of the IDD does not require the existence of noncompete 
agreements.    
15 The database is available at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html. 
The original dataset has 170,413 firm-year observations. 168,599 firm-year observations have 
sufficient information on business headquarters. 
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locations of each firm’s headquarters during the period 1994–2010. The Compustat database, 
by contrast, provides information only on each firm’s most recent state of headquarters. 
Because our key identification strategy requires the accurate determination of firms’ 
historical locations, we focus on the 1994–2010 sample in our main tests. In fact, Klasa et al. 
[2017] find that about 9.3% of Compustat firms relocated from one state to another, which in 
our view, could introduce substantial measurement errors in the IDD variable. In addition, 
the adoption and status of the IDD in each state are likely to be better known after the 
prominent PepsiCo case. Nonetheless, we subsequently conduct a robust check by starting 
the sample period from 1977 following Klasa et al. [2017] in Section 5. 
From the initial sample, we delete financial firms (SIC code from 6000 to 6999) and 
firms headquartered outside the United States. After further data requirements including 
necessary customer disclosure and financial data, we are left with a final sample of 28,547 
firm–year observations over the period 1994–2010. Panel A of Table 1 presents a more 
detailed description of our sample construction process. 
 
3.2 THE IDD INDICATOR 
We use the Klasa et al. [2017] coding of adoption of the IDD. This coding is based on 
a list of IDD-related cases collected from prior legal studies (Kahnke, Bundy, and Liebman 
[2008], Malsberger [2011], Waldref [2012], Wiesner [2012]). Klasa et al. then identify all the 
precedent-setting cases from the initial list using the procedure described in Section 3.3 of 
their paper. Appendix 2, replicated from Klasa et al. [2017], lists all the precedent-setting 
cases for the period 1919–2011. Our identification strategy requires the assumption that 
firms are aware of the precedent-setting cases of their headquarters states. We argue that 
this assumption is likely to be valid for the following reasons. First, the protection of trade 
secrets is critical for firms’ competitive advantage and thus firms are expected to closely 
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monitor the development of trade secrets laws. Second, it is quite probable that the extensive 
media coverage of prominent cases, such as the PepsiCo suit, significantly increases the 
public awareness of the IDD and prompts firms in other states to more actively track the 
precedent-setting cases in their own states.16 Although most of the precedent-setting cases 
were not widely discussed in the popular media, we find that all of these cases were discussed 
in legal journals (including professional education materials) and were cited by corresponding 
state courts within one year of the precedent-setting dates. Moreover, it is important to note 
that almost all public firms have in-house legal counsels overseeing legal matters including 
those related to labor and employment. Further, there is substantial empirical evidence 
showing that General Counsels play an important advisory role in firms’ financial reporting 
and disclosure decisions (e.g., Kwak et al. [2012], Hopkins et al. [2015]). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that firms are keenly aware of and understand the implications of the 
IDD precedent-setting cases.17  
A firm headquartered in one state could be subject to common laws of multiple states. 
However, there are several reasons that the law of the headquarters state is the applicable 
law in a large number of trade secret-related disputes. First, in determining which state’s 
law governs a trade secret-related dispute, courts often favor the state with the most 
significant relationship to the dispute (Ingle [2013]), which in many cases turns out to be the 
headquarters state (Jones [2014]). Second, the law of headquarters state is important 
because of the lex loci contractus (“law of the place where the contract is made”) principle in 
                                                          
16 Other cases in Appendix 2 that received notable media attention are Uncle B’s Bakery v. 
O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996), Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (Utah D.C. 1998), and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2000).  
17 To the extent that some firms may not be aware of these cases, our empirical results should be 
biased toward the null. In addition, Klasa et al. [2017] document significant stock market reactions 
to a home state court’s final decision to adopt the IDD, suggesting that the capital market is aware of 
the IDD legal events.  
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labor and employment laws (Pollard [2014]). In addition, the firm can designate the law of 
the headquarters state as the applicable law using the ‘choice of law provision’ in employment 
contracts (Steinmeyer and Freeman [2016]). Alternatively, the firm could resort to the ‘choice 
of forum provision’ to select the court in the state where it is headquartered to resolve any 
disputes (Bertram [2013], Jones [2014]). 
As noted in the Introduction and Klasa et al. [2017], the IDD of a firm’s home state is 
applicable even if the employee intends to move to a rival that is located in another state. In 
many of the IDD precedent-setting cases listed in Appendix 2 (e.g., Branson Ultrasonics Corp. 
v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996), and Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole 
Food Co. Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001)), the state law of the plaintiff’s 
headquarters was applied by the court because the location of company headquarters was 
“the principal place of business” and had the most significant relationship to the dispute, 
although the defendant was moving to a different state. In discussing the applicable laws in 
trade secret misappropriation cases, Crowell & Moring LLP [2011] cites a Massachusetts 
District Court case enforcing a Massachusetts non-compete clause against a California 
resident working for a California company, despite California’s public policy against non-
competes and despite case law casting doubt on the existence of a trade secret exception to 
this policy under California law.18 Crowell & Moring LLP [2011: p.1] summarizes: 
The Court determined that California’s interest in the case was weaker than or at 
best equal to Massachusetts’ interest because the employment contract was 
negotiated by a Massachusetts company (the former employer) for an employee who 
worked at least in part in Massachusetts, and any harm caused by its violation would 
be felt in Massachusetts. 
 
During our sample period, there are 11 cases in which state courts adopted the IDD 
and 3 cases in which state courts rejected the IDD after recognizing it in prior years. The 
                                                          
18 See Aspect Software, Inc. v. Barnett, F. Supp.2d, No. CIV.A. 11-10754-DJC (D. Mass. May 27, 
2011). 
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IDD indicator is then constructed using the dates of precedent-setting cases. Specifically, for 
the 11 states whose courts adopted the IDD during our sample period, the IDD indicator is 
zero in all years prior to the date of the precedent-setting cases and 1 afterwards. For the 
seven states whose courts adopted the IDD before 1994 and never reversed it during our 
sample period, we set the IDD indicator equal to 1. For the three states whose courts adopted 
the IDD before 1994 but rejected it during our sample period, we set the IDD indicator equal 
to 1 before the precedent-setting case and zero afterwards.19 For the remaining 27 states 
whose courts did not adopt the IDD at any time in history, we set the IDD indicator equal to 
zero in all years.20 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the frequency of firm-year observations in each state 
during our sample period, together with the mean value of the IDD indicator. In 27 states, 
the average value of the IDD indicator is zero, due to the fact that these states did not adopt 
the IDD throughout our sample period. In seven states, the average value of the IDD 
indicator is one, because these states adopted the IDD before our sample period and never 
rejected the IDD during our sample period. In 14 states, the average value of the IDD 
indicator is between zero and one, suggesting that these states either adopted or rejected the 
IDD during our sample period. The number of firm-years located in these 14 states is 9,887, 
representing about 35% of the total sample size. Moreover, it appears that the number of 
firms spreads reasonably well across these states, although relatively more observations are 
from Texas (2,588). Overall, there are substantial variations in the adoption status of the 
IDD across states and over time and observations are not extremely concentrated in one or 
                                                          
19 For simplicity, we refer to the impact of changes in court opinions regarding the IDD as the impact 
of IDD adoption. 
20 We have confirmed these states’ stances through extensive online search. Most of the 27 states did 
not address the IDD in history. Four of the 27 states explicitly rejected the IDD (CA in 2002, LA in 
1967, MD in 2004, VA in 1999), although none of them ever adopted the IDD prior to the rejection.  
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two states. Nevertheless, in robustness tests, we conduct state-level regressions to mitigate 
the concern that there are insufficient state-level variations in our firm-level regressions.  
To explore potential state-level confounds, Appendix 3 presents an analysis of whether 
the adoption or rejection of the IDD is correlated with any state-level political or economic 
factors. Appendix 3 shows that Democratic-leaning states are more likely to adopt and less 
likely to reject the IDD. The economic activity of public firms (i.e., total size and number of 
public firms) appears to be negatively related to the adoption of the IDD and positively 
related to the rejection of the IDD. State GDP growth rate has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of the adoption of the IDD and state unemployment rate has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of the rejection of the IDD. To the extent that these state-level factors are 
correlated with proprietary costs of disclosure, our empirical findings could suffer from 
omitted-variable biases. To address this problem, in our main tests, we control for state GDP 
growth rate and unemployment rate.21 Moreover, in a robustness check, we restrict the 
sample of control firms to those in neighboring states to further control for unobserved 
variation in local conditions.   
 
3.3 DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER IDENTITY 
Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose sales to and the identity of any customer 
that accounts for more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated sales revenues if the loss of the 
customer would have a material adverse effect on the firm’s performance. In practice, 
however, there is great variation in the reporting of customer information. According to the 
Compustat database, many firms disclose the existence of major customers but do not reveal 
the identity of these customers. Thus, it appears that enforcement of Regulation S-K is weak 
                                                          
21 We note, however, that our results are robust to controlling for all the variables in the table of 
Appendix 3 (see Table OA4). 
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in practice and that disclosure of customer information is largely voluntary. Still, many firms 
disclose smaller customers (generating less than 10% of a firm’s total sales) with or without 
revealing the names of these customers. 
In our study, we examine a firm’s decision to conceal the identities of its reported 
customers. Revealing the identities of a firm’s customers helps rival firms approach these 
customers and estimate the productive capacity of the disclosing firm (Ellis et al. [2012]). In 
addition, customer identity information may enable competitors to infer the pricing strategy 
and cost structure of a firm’s products. Thus, we argue that disclosure choices regarding 
customer identity impose significant costs on a firm in terms of its competitive positions. 
We construct two simple measures of customer identity disclosure. The first measure, 
Ratio 1, is the percentage of reported customers without identity information. The second 
measure, Ratio 2, is a sales-weighted version of the first measure. Specifically, for Ratio 2, in 
calculating the percentage of unidentified customers, we assign a weight to each reported 
customer based on the amount of sales to this customer. In constructing these measures, we 
require that a firm has non-missing customer information from Compustat Segment Files 
and that it has at least one customer that accounts for more than 10% of its total sales. Ellis 
et al. [2012] find that concealment of customer information is largely a disclosure policy in 
that few firms conceal the names of some customers but reveal the names of other customers 
in a specific year. Based on this observation, instead of using ratios, we also use an indicator 
variable to capture the disclosure policy and find similar results for all tests. We use the 
ratios in our tabulated results, because they are more precise. 
One potential concern about the practical validity of our disclosure measures is that 
the concealment of a customer’s name may not be helpful if the firm has ever disclosed the 
name of the customer in the past. However, since the customer-supplier relationship does not 
last forever, it is difficult for outsiders to know whether the non-disclosure is due to the loss 
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of the particular customer or the firm’s choice not to reveal the name of the customer.22 In 
other words, the trade secrets in question are the identities of the firm’s current customers. 
Moreover, firms develop new customers from time to time (if not every year) and it may be 
more important to conceal the new customers’ identities.23 Finally, even if we assume that 
competitors can have knowledge about the firm’s customer list from other sources, managers 
may still have incentives to conceal the names of these customers in their current financial 
reports if the IDD is adopted. The non-disclosure of the customer information in public 
reports increases the chances that the firm obtains an injunction to prevent key employees 
(who personally maintain the relationships with the customer) from joining competing firms, 
which in turn, make it more difficult for competitors to capitalize on the information they 
know.  
 
3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The main control variables are taken from Ellis et al. [2012]. We include R&D 
expenditures to sales, advertisement expenditure to sales, and intangible assets scaled by 
total assets to control for a firm’s proprietary costs of disclosure. We argue that these 
measures, however, may also capture other economic conditions, such as a firm’s growth 
potential and risk profile. We further include an indicator variable that indicates whether 
the value of R&D is missing from Compustat. We also include 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry concentration ratio to control for the effect of competition on 
                                                          
22 According to Compustat Segment database, about one third of the disclosed relationship lasts for 
one year. For the remaining two-thirds, the median (mean) length of relationship is around three 
(five) years (e.g., Cen et al. [2016]).    
23 Using a random sample of 100 firms (1,012 firm-years), we manually check the mix of significant 
customers. On average, the percentage of new customers as a fraction of all customers (including 
both identified and unidentified customers) is 24%, and the percentage of new customers as a 
fraction of total identified customers is 34%.   
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disclosure. To capture capital market benefits of disclosure, we include two indicator 
variables to indicate whether the firm announces an SEO or M&A in the year following the 
disclosure year. We include firm size and auditor size to capture the tendency for 
transparency and compliance. Larger firms and firms with big N auditors are likely to be 
more transparent and more likely to comply with disclosure rules. Finally, we include state 
GDP growth rate and state unemployment rate to capture the economic conditions of the 
firm’s headquarters state. Appendix 1 presents definitions of all variables and Panel C of 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main regression variables. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 IMPACT OF IDD ON DISCLOSURE: EVENT-TIME PLOTS 
Figure 1 depicts the impact of IDD on customer information disclosure, based on the 
fitted lines of three-order-polynomial regressions. We include high-order polynomials to allow 
for the possibility of nonlinearity around the cut-off time.24 The figure illustrates visually the 
impact of IDD adoption on disclosure of customer identity. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the 
results using Ratio 1 as the Y-axis variable (percent of unidentified customers) and panel B 
of Figure 1 shows the results of using Ratio 2 as the Y-axis variable (sales-weighted percent 
of unidentified customers). In each panel, the X-axis represents the distance in months to the 
date of IDD adoption, with negative values indicating pre-adoption months and positive 
values indicating post-adoption months. The figures in both panels show a clear discontinuity 
at the date of IDD adoption. 
Figure 1 shows that the average percentage of unidentified customers increases after 
adoption of the IDD. Numerically, the average percentage of unidentified customers, 
                                                          
24 The results are qualitatively the same if we use linear regressions without higher order 
polynomials. 
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measured by Ratio 1 (Ratio 2) is 0.429 (0.447) before IDD adoption. After adoption of the IDD, 
this figure changes to 0.464 (0.482), representing an 8.16% (7.83%) increase. The increase in 
the percentage of unidentified customers is more pronounced immediately after adoption of 
the IDD, with the effect of the IDD becoming more moderate with the passage of time. Overall, 
the visual results are consistent with our prediction that adoption of the IDD decreases the 
level of disclosure of proprietary information. 
 
4.2 IMPACT OF IDD ON DISCLOSURE: DID REGRESSIONS 
We next use a DiD regression to examine how adoption of the IDD by state courts 
impacts the level of disclosure regarding customer identity. Following Bertrand and 
Mullainathan [2003], we estimate the following model: 
 
ln⁡(1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 +𝜔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡,        (1) 
 
where i denotes firm i, s denotes the state of the firm’s headquarters, and t denotes the year. 
The variable NonDisclosure is one of the two customer information disclosure measures: 
Ratio 1 or Ratio 2. Note that higher values of Ratio 1 or Ratio 2 indicate lower levels of 
disclosure of customer information. IDD is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
state court adopted the IDD in the firm’s state of headquarters by year t. X is the vector of 
control variables defined in Section 3. ωi is the firm/industry fixed effect, θs is the state fixed 
effect, and τt is the year fixed effect. We include state fixed effects because of the fact that 
some firms change their state of headquarters location during the sample period. The set of 
fixed effects allows us to control for time-invariant differences in disclosure across states and 
omitted firm/industry characteristics, as well as intertemporal economy-wide shocks to 
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disclosure levels, such as various disclosure regulations. To address concerns about 
autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the state level given that the key independent 
variable of interest is at the state level (Imbens and Wooldridge [2009]). The coefficient β 
captures the average changes in disclosure levels of firms headquartered in the IDD adopting 
states (i.e., the treatment states) relative to the contemporaneous changes in disclosure levels 
of firms headquartered in unaffected states (i.e., the control states). An important advantage 
of the test is that different states adopted the IDD at different times, which allows a given 
adopting state to be both a treatment and a control state. Moreover, the specification is not 
affected by the fact that some states did not adopt the IDD during our sample period and 
some states adopted the IDD before the start of our sample period (Klasa et al. [2017]). 
Table 2 presents the DiD regression results. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 report the 
results of using Ratio 1 as the dependent variable and columns (2) and (4) report the results 
based on Ratio 2. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on IDD, β, is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. The magnitudes of the coefficient (0.022 and 0.024, respectively, in columns 
1 and 2) suggest that firms increase the likelihood of concealing customer identity by 7.12% 
(7.56% for Ratio 2) following adoption of the IDD, which is economically meaningful.25 To put 
these figures in perspective, the economic impact of R&D and adverting expenditures (a 
change from its 10th to 90th percentile) documented by Ellis et al. [2012] is 3.25% and 2.91%, 
respectively. 
In columns (3) and (4), we replace industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. We 
retain state fixed effects because of the fact that some firms change their state of 
headquarters location during the sample period. The impact of the IDD on non-disclosure of 
                                                          
25 Since the dependent variable is in the form of ln (1+ y), its first derivative should be ∆y/(1+y), and 
the economic magnitude is estimated by β×(1+y)/y. Thus, the economic magnitudes of the coefficients 
are 7.12% (0.022×(1+0.447)/0.447)) and 7.56% (0.024× (1+0.465)/0.465), respectively.  
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customer identity continues to be significant. The magnitudes of the coefficient (0.028 and 
0.027, respectively, in columns 3 and 4) suggest that firms increase the likelihood of 
concealing customer identity by 9.06% (8.74% for Ratio 2) following adoption of the IDD, 
which is economically significant. Overall, the results provide strong support for an 
economically meaningful effect of the proprietary costs of disclosure. That is, adoption of the 
IDD exogenously increases the proprietary costs of disclosure and firms respond to this shock 
by significantly reducing disclosure levels of proprietary information. 
Regarding the control variables, we find that the coefficient on the indicator variable, 
Missing RD, is positive and significant. It appears that firms without R&D expenditures are 
more likely to conceal the identity of customers, contrary to the proprietary cost hypothesis. 
However, firms with missing R&D from Compustat may be those firms with high proprietary 
costs who conceal information regarding their R&D expenditures (Koh and Reeb [2015]). The 
coefficient on R&D expenditure is negative and significant, which is inconsistent with the 
findings in Ellis et al. [2012]. However, the coefficient becomes positive if we do not include 
the missing R&D indicator variable. The coefficients of intangible assets and advertising 
expenditures are insignificant. The coefficient on industry concentration is negative and 
significant. Given the complex nature of the theory and measurement of industry 
concentration, we draw no inference from this result.26 Consistent with Ellis et al. [2012], 
firms disclose more before SEO announcements. However, the coefficient on M&A 
announcement is positive and somewhat unexpected.27 In our regression, we include the 
control variables to account for the potential omitted variables problem. However, we caution 
                                                          
26 Table OA1 of the online appendix shows that our results are robust to controlling for product 
market concentration estimated based on U.S. Census data (Ali et al. [2014]). In our main tests, we 
use the traditional concentration measure because measures based on U.S. Census data reduce the 
sample size substantially. 
27 Our inferences are not affected if we further control for concurrent SEO or M&A announcements. 
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against drawing inferences from the coefficients of these control variables, because they may 
be endogenously chosen and thus suffer from alternative explanations. 
 
4.3 DYNAMICS 
 A causal interpretation of the effect of the IDD adoption on customer identity 
disclosure in our DiD regressions requires that the treatment and the control firms follow 
parallel trends absent of changes in the status of the IDD adoption. To test the validity of our 
empirical strategy, we next introduce lead-lag terms in our DiD regression. In Table 3, IDD 
Adoption-2, IDD Adoption-1, IDD Adoption0, IDD Adoption+1, and IDD Adoption2+ are equal to 
one if the firm is headquartered in a state that will adopt the IDD in two years, will adopt 
the IDD in one year, adopted the IDD in the current year, adopted the IDD one year ago, and 
adopted the IDD two or more years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise.28 We use firm-fixed-
effect specifications to make sure that we are comparing within-firm trends in the disclosure 
of customer identity between the treatment and the control firms and that firm fixed effects 
hold the sample composition constant (Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003]). For both Ratio1 
(column 1) and Ratio2 (column 2), the coefficients on IDD Adoption-2, IDD Adoption-1, and 
IDD Adoption0 are insignificant, indicating no evidence of the existence of a pre-IDD trend in 
the disclosure of customer identity between the treatment and the control firms. In column 
1, the coefficient on IDD Adoption 2+ is positive and significant, and in column 2, the 
coefficients on both IDD Adoption+1 and IDD Adoption2+ are positive and significant, 
suggesting that firms begin to reduce the disclosure of customer identity in one or two years 
                                                          
28 For the full sample, it is difficult to include both adoption and rejection events. Following Klasa et 
al. [2017], in an alternative specification, we control for IDD Rejection, which equals one if the state 
in which the firm is headquartered has rejected the previously adopted IDD by year t, and zero 
otherwise. The results are robust.  
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after adoption of the IDD. Figure OA1 presents a graphical illustration of the IDD adoption 
effect in event time. 
 In the dynamic analysis of Table 3, the benchmark period includes all years prior to 
year -2. Next, we conduct an alternative dynamic analysis restricting the sample to two years 
before and two years after the IDD adoption or rejection event. Table OA2 reports the results. 
In Table OA2, the base year is the IDD adoption or rejection year. Panel A of Table OA2 
presents the dynamic results for IDD adoptions. The coefficients on IDD Adoption-2 and IDD 
Adoption-1 are insignificant, suggesting no evidence of reverse causality or the violation of 
the parallel trends assumption. The coefficient on IDD Adoption+1 is positive but insignificant 
while the coefficient on IDD Adoption+2 is positive and significant, suggesting that the effect 
of the IDD on the non-disclosure of customer information starts to manifest in the second 
year after the adoption. Panel B of Table OA2 reports the dynamic analysis for IDD rejections. 
In all specifications, the coefficients on all dynamic variables are insignificant. Given the 
small number of IDD rejection events, we conjecture that the results are likely due to limited 
power of the dynamic test.  
 
4.4 CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN THE IMPACT OF IDD ON DISCLOSURE 
We next explore potential cross-sectional variations in the impact of the IDD on 
disclosure. It is arguably more important for a firm to protect its customer identity 
information when the firm faces a higher degree of entry threats. Thus, we expect that the 
effect of the IDD adoption on customer information non-disclosure is more pronounced for 
firms in industries with a higher degree of entry threats. To measure the degree of entry 
threats, we use the industry entry rates constructed by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan [2006].  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the results of interacting the degree of entry threats 
with the IDD indicator. Besides the control variables in Eq. (1) and firm fixed effects, we 
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further include the interaction of state and year fixed effects and the interaction of industry 
and year fixed effects, which effectively remove time-varying state and industry effects.29 
Consistent with our prediction, results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that adoption of 
the IDD has a stronger impact on the non-disclosure of customer information for firms in 
industries with higher entry threats. Specifically, the coefficients suggest that a one standard 
deviation increases in the industry entry rate would increase the impact of the IDD on non-
disclosure by approximately 60-70%. The results are both statistically and economically 
significant. 
For an industry that is old and stable, it is likely that the key players in this industry 
already have a lot of knowledge about the identities of their competitors’ customers. As such, 
the proprietary costs of disclosing customer identity information are lower for firms in more 
stable industries. Consistent with this argument, columns (3) to (4) of Table 4 show that the 
adoption of the IDD has a weaker impact on the non-disclosure of customer information for 
firms in industries with less volatile sales. 
Managers can reduce their firms’ cost of capital by reducing information asymmetry 
through increased levels of disclosure. Given that managers tend to trade off the benefits of 
disclosure in the capital market with proprietary costs of disclosure in the product market, 
we expect that the impact of the IDD on non-disclosure of customer information should be 
less pronounced if firms exhibit a greater reliance on external financing. Following Rajan and 
Zingales [1998], we estimate external financing dependence as the industry median ratio of 
the capital expenditures minus operational cash flow divided by capital expenditures (RZ 
index). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 report the results of interacting external financing 
                                                          
29 The IDD main effect and year effect are subsumed by state-year and industry-year fixed effects. 
For brevity, we only present the coefficients of the variables of interest, the interactions between 
IDD and cross-sectional variables, for all cross-sectional variations analyses.  
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dependence and the IDD indicator. Consistent with our prediction, the impact of the IDD on 
customer identity non-disclosure is less pronounced for firms exhibiting a higher degree of 
external financing dependence. Specifically, a one standard deviation increases in the RZ 
index would lead to about 50% to 60% decreases in the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure. 
The results are again statistically and economically significant.30  
Overall, the effect the IDD adoption on non-disclosure of customer identity is more 
pronounced for firms facing higher threats of losing trade secrets and the effect is less 
pronounced for firms with a higher dependence on external financing. These cross-sectional 
results provide further support for a causal interpretation of our main results because it is 
less likely that unobserved omitted variables can explain both the main results and the cross-
sectional results. 
 
4.5 CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS: OTHER MEASURES OF PRODUCT MARKET 
COMPETITION 
In this section, we further explore the potential moderating effects of several 
alternative measures of production market competition (e.g., Harris [1998], Botosan and 
Stanford [2005], Berger and Hann [2007], Bens, Berger, and Monahan [2011], Ali, Klasa, and 
Yeung [2014]). As discussed earlier, prior research has used these measures to capture the 
proprietary costs of disclosure and produced mixed evidence. Thus, ex ante, we do not have 
clear predictions regarding the interacting effects between the IDD indicator and these 
competition measures. Instead, our motivation here is to examine whether and how these 
                                                          
30 In additional tests, we also interact the IDD indicator with other proxies of potential capital 
market benefits, such as the likelihood of equity and debt issuance, institutional ownership, and 
analyst following. However, coefficients on most of the interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant, with the exception of debt issuance likelihood, for which we find that the impact of the 
IDD on disclosure is less pronounced for firms with a higher likelihood of issuing debt in the future 
(See Table OA3 of Online Appendix).   
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industry competition variables can sort firms on the extent of their proprietary costs of 
disclosure in our context. 
The first industry competition variable we examine is the abnormal profit persistence 
measure constructed by Harris [1998], which is used in subsequent studies of Botosan and 
Stanford [2005] and Berger and Hann [2007], among others. Harris [1998] argues that 
industries with higher abnormal profit persistence should have lower competition. Columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 5 report the results of interacting the IDD indicator with the level of 
abnormal profit persistence. We find that the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure of customer 
identity is marginally less pronounced for firms in industries with high abnormal profit 
persistence (low competition). 
The next variable we examine is Bens et al.’s [2011] combined measure of competition 
capturing both competition from potential new entrants (proxied by the level of capital 
expenditures) and current rivals (proxied by industry price-to-cost margin). Columns (3) and 
(4) report the results. The effect of the IDD on disclosure is less pronounced for firms in 
industries with lower competition (industries with higher level of capital expenditures and 
higher price-to-cost margins). In fact, the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure is insignificant 
for firms in industries with low competition as measured by Bens et al.’s [2011] method. 
Finally, we examine the effect of the concentration ratio of industry market shares. 
Theoretically, firms should face higher risk of losing their customers to competitors if there 
is intense competition in their industry. On the other hand, concentration of market shares 
can be driven partially by trade secrets, and firms with more concentrated product markets 
can have more valuable trade secrets. Columns (5) and (6) report the results of interacting 
the IDD indictor with a Compustat-based measure of industry concentration. The effect of 
the IDD on non-disclosure of customer identity is marginally more pronounced for firms in 
more concentrated industries. In columns (7) and (8), we interact the IDD indicator with a 
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U.S. Census-based measure of concentration which includes both private and public firms 
(e.g., Ali et al. [2014]). In contrast to the results in columns (5) and (6), the effect of the IDD 
on non-disclosure is significantly less pronounced for firms in more concentrated industries. 
A one standard deviation increases in the Census-based concentration ratio would lead to 44% 
to 46% decreases in the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure.  
Overall, the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure of customer identity appears to be 
more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries, when competition is measured 
using Harris’s [1998] abnormal profit persistence proxy, Bens et al.’s [2011] combined 
measure of competition, and the U.S. Census-based industry concentration ratio. To the 
extent that these measures capture proprietary costs of disclosure without substantial errors, 
the cross-sectional results suggest that ex-ante proprietary costs of disclosure enhances the 
impact of the IDD on the concealment of customer identity.  
 
5. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks 
 In this section, we conduct several additional tests and robustness checks to further 
buttress the causal effects of the IDD adoption on the disclosure of customer identities. 
 
5.1 GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION OF EMPLOYEES 
Our main tests rely on the adoption of the IDD in a firm’s state of headquarters, where 
arguably most of the firm’s employees with access to trade secrets are employed (Klasa et al. 
[2017]). However, using a firm’s headquarters-state’s IDD adoption to measure the firm’s 
overall exposure to the IDD can involve substantial measurement errors for firms that have 
a geographically dispersed workforce. To capture the overall exposure to the IDD protection 
more accurately, we estimate a weighted-measure of IDD exposure that takes into account 
the number of employees for multi-state firms in each state that the firm has subsidiaries, 
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branches, or plants. Specifically, for each firm-year observation, we obtain the number of 
employees working in each state and in the year from the National Establishment Time 
Series (NETS) database. The database provides a comprehensive record of all business 
establishments in the U.S. since 1989.31 We then calculate a firm’s weighted exposure to the 
IDD in a year as follows: 
 
Weighted IDD = ∑
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡×𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑠
𝑠=1
𝑠
𝑠=1  ,      (2) 
 
where employeesi,s,t is firm i’s number of employees in state s in year t and  IDDs,t is the IDD 
adoption indicator for state s in year t. Table 6 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1) after 
replacing IDD with Weighted IDD. The coefficients on the weighted version of IDD adoption 
are 0.030 and 0.031, respectively, for regressions with Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 as the dependent 
variables. The coefficients are economically larger than those reported in Table 2, suggesting 
that ignoring the geographic dispersion of workforce likely understates firms’ response to the 
IDD. 
As an additional way to address the measurement error problem, we also re-estimate 
Eq. (1) using a reduced sample of firms with a majority of their employees working in the 
headquarters states. Table 7 reports the results. The coefficients on the IDD Adoption 
indicator are 0.041 and 0.042, respectively, for regressions with Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 as the 
dependent variables. The effects are again larger than those reported in Table 2, confirming 
                                                          
31 We merge our main sample with NETS by company names. Approximately half of our sample 
firms are covered by NETS. We assume that firms that do not have plant-level data in NETS do not 
have operations in multiple states. In robustness tests, we re-estimate the weighted IDD effects 
using only observations covered by NETS and the results continue to hold.  
35 
 
our observation that the estimates in our main test are conservative due to geographic 
dispersion of the workforce.32 
 
5.2 STATE-LEVEL CONFOUNDS 
As discussed in Section 3, adoption of the IDD is identified based on judicial decisions, 
which are more likely to be driven by the merits of precedent-setting cases than state 
economic conditions. Nevertheless, to address the potential omitted variables problem, we 
include in our regression models observed state-level economic conditions, in the form of state 
growth and unemployment rates. In Table OA4, we include more state-level variables and 
the results continue to be robust. To further isolate potential confounding factors, we next 
restrict the control states of each adopting state to its neighbors (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. [2017]). 
Suppose the adoption of the IDD is driven by unobserved changes in local conditions and 
firms respond to these changes rather than to adoption of the IDD. In such a case, both firms 
in the adopting states and in the neighboring, non-adopting states would spuriously appear 
to react to adoption of the IDD, because unobserved changes in economic conditions are likely 
to spill across state borders. To remove these potential confounding effects, we match each 
adopting state with its neighboring states and include only the neighboring states in the 
control sample. If state neighbors are exposed to roughly the same local economic conditions, 
we can then difference away the unobserved confounds using a shared border fixed effect. 
Essentially, we are comparing firms in each adopting state with their peers in neighboring, 
non-adopting states. Table 8 reports the results of estimating the effect of IDD from 
variations within shared-border states. We find that the effect of the IDD on non-disclosure 
of customer information continues to be significant. 
                                                          
32 Note, however, that the IDD coefficients in Table 6 and 7 are not statistically larger than those in 
Table 2.  
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5.3 PLACEBO TEST 
To further enhance the credibility of our results, we next conduct a placebo test. 
Toward this end, for each state that adopted (rejected) the IDD, we randomly select a pseudo-
IDD adoption (rejection) year and construct an indicator variable, Placebo IDD, using the 
same procedure as our main tests. We then re-estimate Eq. (1) by replacing IDD with Placebo 
IDD. We repeat this exercise for 1,000 times and plot the discretized probability density of 
the placebo coefficients in Figure OA2 of the Online Appendix. For comparison, we also 
include a line for the IDD coefficient based on actual IDD events. Figure OA2 shows that the 
placebo coefficient largely follows a normal distribution centered at zero (mean = 0.0008; 
standard error = 0.0042 when Ratio1 is the dependent variable; mean = 0.0007; standard 
error = 0.004 when Ratio 2 is the dependent variable). The actual IDD coefficient is more 
than four standard deviations larger than the mean of placebo coefficients. 
 
5.4 REMOVING NON-PRECEDENT-SETTING STATES 
The IDD was developed and applied as common law on a state-to-state basis (e.g., 
Kahnke et al. [2008], Wiesner [2012]). An IDD precedent-setting case becomes case law of 
the state and the courts in that state will subsequently follow its ruling on the applicability 
of the IDD. A court, before ruling on a new IDD legal case, will survey the previous state 
decisions addressing the IDD. If the courts in a state haven’t considered the IDD, it remains 
unclear whether the IDD is viable.33 Therefore, relative to these states with unclear stance, 
the states that have explicitly recognized the IDD should provide a stronger protection of 
                                                          
33 For example, the interpretation of the IDD in California had attracted years of speculations before 
the state court decision to reject the IDD in Schlage Lock Company v. Whyte [2002] 101 Cal. App. 4th 
1443. 
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trade secrets. In our main research design, we set the IDD indicator to zero for every year for 
states that never explicitly considered the IDD. To test the robustness of our results to this 
design choice, we next re-examine the effect of the IDD by excluding firms in these states 
with unsettled legal stance on the IDD. That is, we restrict our sample to those firms in the 
21 states in which we can clearly identify adoption or rejection of the IDD. Columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 9 present the results using this reduced sample. The effect of the IDD on non-
disclosure of customer information is robust to this alternative research design. 
 
5.5 ALTERNATIVE SAMPLE PERIOD AND THE EFFECT OF UTSA 
 To measure the variable IDD Adoption more accurately, we use observations during 
the period of 1994–2010, where we can precisely identify firms’ historical headquarters 
locations. In this section, we re-estimate Eq. (1) using an expanded sample starting from 
1977. For firm-year observations that we cannot identify historical locations, we use the most 
recently available locations. Because many states adopted the UTSA before 1994, we include 
an additional control variable, UTSA, defined similarly as IDD.34 Specifically, for states that 
adopted the UTSA during the sample period, the UTSA indicator is zero in all years prior to 
the adoption year and 1 afterwards. For states that adopted the UTSA before 1977, we set 
the UTSA indicator to 1 and for states that never adopted UTSA we set the indicator to zero.  
Table OA5 of the Online Appendix presents the results. The effect of the IDD adoption 
on disclosures of customer identities continues to be statistically and economically significant 
in this alternative sample. In this study, we use the 1994–2010 sample in our baseline 
regressions because testing power (or Type II errors) appears to be less of a concern than the 
                                                          
34 Note that it is not necessary to control for UTSA in our main test because few states adopted 
UTSA during the period 1994–2010 and thus the effect of UTSA is largely absorbed by state fixed 
effects. In a robustness check, we show that the effect of the IDD on disclosure is identical after 
controlling for UTSA for our main test (i.e., Table 2). 
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measurement error problem, given that we have already a large number of observations and 
that we find significant results even with the shorter sample period. Interestingly, the 
adoption of the UTSA on the concealment of customer identity is also positive, but the effect 
is much smaller than that of the IDD and is statistically insignificant. The results are 
consistent with our earlier argument that the IDD provides much more powerful protection 
for trade secrets than the UTSA.  
 
5.6 SMALL BUSINESS REPORTING SAMPLE 
Although the SEC appears to require firms to disclose the identity of their major 
customers, many firms fail to do so. Thus, we argue that disclosure of customer identity is, 
to some extent, voluntary. However, interpreting our measures as representing purely 
voluntary disclosures is still problematic (Beyer et al. [2010]). Thus, one caveat of our 
research is the mixed nature of our disclosure measures. We argue, however, that the mixed 
nature of disclosure measures is not a substantial concern in testing the proprietary cost 
hypothesis, since this hypothesis should lead to the same predictions regarding the impact of 
the proprietary costs of disclosures on the levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
Nevertheless, we next partially address this concern by restricting the sample to small 
business firms under Regulation S-B. Regulation S-B requires firms to disclose the existence 
of important customers but not the names of these customers. Thus, disclosure of customer 
identity for this sample of firms is purely voluntary. Table OA6 of the Online Appendix 
reports the results. The main results continue to hold for this small business firm sample. 
 
5.7 IDD AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
Klasa et al. [2017] find that the IDD adoptions decrease competitive threats, which in 
turn, increase financial leverage. Greater reliance on debt financing may reduce the capital 
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market benefits of public disclosure because firms can communicate with banks using private 
channels (e.g., Dang et al. [2014]). Thus, one potential concern is that the reduction in 
disclosure we observe may be driven by the shift in capital structure. In Table OA7 of the 
Online Appendix, we show that our results are not affected if we include financial leverage 
as an additional control variable, suggesting that the leverage effect is unlikely to be one of 
the mechanisms through which IDD adoption affects disclosure. 
A related issue is that the reduction in proprietary disclosures we document may 
constitute an informational channel that drives the leverage results in Klasa et al. [2017]. 
That is, adoption of the IDD increases the proprietary costs of public disclosure and firms 
shift to debt financing that relies less on public disclosure. To investigate this possibility, we 
first replicate Klasa et al.’s results and then we control for our disclosure measures. Table 
OA8 of the Online Appendix shows that the effect of the IDD on financial leverage is only 
mildly reduced after controlling for Ratio1 or Ratio2, although the effect of (non)disclosure 
on financial leverage is significant. Overall, we conclude that the effects documented in our 
paper and those in Klasa et al. [2017] are largely independent.   
 
5.8 STATE-LEVEL REGRESSIONS 
 In our firm-level regressions, there is a substantial variation in the number of 
observations across different states. If the great majority of firms were concentrated in a few 
states, the effective power of state-level variations in the IDD adoption would be reduced. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, Panel B, suggest that this is unlikely to be the 
case. Nevertheless, to increase the effective power of the tests, we conduct a state-level 
regression as follows. First, we estimate a firm-level regression of Ratio1 (Ratio2)  on a set of 
control variables, including Missing RD, RD to sale, Intangibility, Adverting, Size, HHI, Big 
N, SEO, MA, Unemployment and GDP. Second, we obtain the residuals from the first step 
40 
 
and define state-year-level disclosure ratios (State_Ratio1 and State_Ratio2) as the average 
residuals for each state-year. Third, we regress the state-year-level disclosure ratios on the 
IDD indicator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Table 10 reports the state-level 
regression results. To mitigate the concerns about individual state-outliers, we estimate the 
standard errors using a jackknife approach. The coefficients on IDD are positive and 
statistically and economically significant in both regressions when State_Ratio1 and 
State_Ratio1 are the dependent variables, respectively, consistent with our firm-level 
regression results. 
 
5.9 SEGMENT DISCLOSURES 
In this section, we examine whether our main results are generalizable to segment 
disclosure, given that many of the prior studies on the proprietary cost hypothesis look at 
segment disclosure. Specifically, we investigate the effect of the IDD on segment reporting 
aggregation (e.g., Bens et al. [2011]). Following the spirit of Bens et al. [2011], we measure 
the discretionary aggregation of segment information by comparing reported segments in 
Compustat with “pseudo segments” inferred from plant-level data in NETS. The indicator 
variable, Pseudo Segments, takes the value of one if the firm has at least one pseudo segment 
that is not reported as an external segment, and zero otherwise. Table OA9 reports the 
results of re-estimating Eq. (1) by replacing the dependent variable with Pseudo Segments. 
The coefficients on IDD adoption are positive and marginally significant, suggesting that 
firms have greater incentives to aggregate their segments in financial reports when facing 
higher proprietary costs of disclosure.35  
                                                          
35 We caution against a strong interpretation of our results on segment disclosure. Unlike Bens et al. 
[2011], who use confidential U.S. Census Bureau data, our NETS-based measure may involve 
measurement errors given that the database is publicly available. Moreover, as discussed in the 
Introduction, segment disclosure may capture agency motives.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the financial reporting and disclosure literature by 
identifying and quantifying the causal effect of proprietary costs on corporate disclosure. We 
exploit the impact of staggered adoption of the IDD across U.S. states on firms’ disclosure of 
their customers’ identities. Adoption of the IDD exogenously increases the proprietary costs 
of disclosure, or equivalently, the proprietary benefits of non-disclosure, and firms respond 
to the shock by reducing the level of disclosure regarding their customers’ identities. The 
results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Using cross-sectional analyses, we find 
that the impact of the IDD on disclosure is driven by firms in industries with a higher degree 
of entry threats, firms in younger and more volatile industries, and firms with a lower degree 
of external financing dependence. 
Our paper also extends the literature on how laws impact financial reporting and 
disclosure. Previous research along this line has generally focused on laws pertaining to the 
capital markets, such as company laws and disclosure rules. In contrast, our paper studies 
legal protections for trade secrets, which pertains to the intellectual property and labor laws. 
Our evidence suggests that trade secrets laws can have potential spillover effects on capital 
market disclosures. Thus, to gain a more complete picture of corporate disclosure, it is 
important for future research to explore this type of spillover effect from non-capital market 
regulations. 
Our study has at least two limitations. First, although we argue that adoption of the 
IDD is exogenous to corporate disclosure decisions, unlike in randomized experiments, we do 
not actually randomly assign firms into treatment and control groups (Gow et al. [2016]; Li 
and Zhang [2015]). As a result, there is always a possibility that some unknown changes in 
economic environments impact both the judicial decisions of the adopting states and the 
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corporate disclosures of firms headquartered in these states. In addition, even if the IDD 
events are entirely exogenous to disclosure decisions, they provide at most indirect shocks to 
proprietary costs. Given the unobservable nature of proprietary costs, we cannot test whether 
or to what extent the IDD adoptions affect proprietary costs of disclosure. Second, our study 
employs a measure of disclosure that is arguably associated with significant proprietary costs, 
which partially addresses the concerns raised by Lang and Sul [2014]. However, by focusing 
on disclosures of customer information, our results may not be generalizable to other 
corporate disclosures, although we show that our results appear to be generalizable to 
segment disclosures. With these caveats in mind, we believe that our research represents a 
meaningful advancement in the literature on the proprietary cost hypothesis of corporate 
disclosure. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
McDonald’s headquarters data (1994 to 2010) 168,599 
Deleting firms without customer (company) reporting  (128,156) 
Deleting financial firms (2,065) 
Deleting firms without customer representing 10% or more of their 
sales 
(9,048)  
Deleting firms located in foreign countries  (447) 
Deleting firms without financial information in previous year (336) 
Observations for main regression (Max.) 28,547 
Observations that are eligible for small business reporting  12,340 
Observations that are not eligible for small business reporting 16,207 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution  
State Firm–year observations % IDD=1 
AR 117 0.85 
AZ 352 0.00 
CA 5,945 0.00 
CO 915 0.00 
CT 693 0.96 
DC 28 0.00 
DE 61 1.00 
FL 1,200 0.42 
GA 585 0.78 
HI 46 0.00 
IA 96 0.94 
ID 87 0.00 
IL 978 1.00 
IN 291 0.94 
KS 116 0.27 
KY 120 0.00 
LA 232 0.00 
MA 1,678 0.99 
MD 459 0.00 
ME 38 0.00 
MI 591 0.51 
MN 926 1.00 
MO 350 0.59 
MS 62 0.00 
MT 53 0.00 
NC 481 1.00 
NE 84 0.00 
NH 121 0.00 
NJ 1,520 1.00 
NM 43 0.00 
NV 151 0.00 
NY 2,554 1.00 
OH 823 0.62 
OK 299 0.00 
OR 364 0.00 
PA 1,130 1.00 
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RI 93 0.00 
SC 122 0.00 
SD 15 0.00 
TN 275 0.00 
TX 2,588 0.52 
UT 325 0.85 
VA 495 0.00 
VT 32 0.00 
WA 434 0.86 
WI 365 0.00 
WV 36 0.00 
WY 26 0.00 
Total 28,547 0.506 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Median STD 
Ratio 1 28,547 0.447 0.333 0.444 
Ratio 2 28,547 0.465 0.351 0.462 
IDD 28,547 0.506 1.000 0.500 
Intangibility 28,547 0.039 0.000 0.089 
Advertising 28,547 0.010 0.000 0.034 
Size 28,547 4.592 4.573 2.164 
Abnormal ROA 28,547 0.442 0.406 0.322 
BIG N 28,547 0.723 1.000 0.447 
HHI 28,547 0.255 0.196 0.185 
Missing R&D 28,547 0.370 0.000 0.483 
R&D 28,547 0.236 0.012 0.835 
Analyst following 28,547 4.737 2.000 7.254 
IO  28,547 0.280 0.123 0.329 
MA 28,547 0.179 0.000 0.384 
SEO 28,547 0.056 0.000 0.229 
GDP 28,547 2.909 3.100 2.759 
Unemployment  28,547 5.437 5.283 1.491 
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TABLE 2 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.028** 0.027** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) 
Missing RD 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.012 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
RD to sales -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Intangibility  0.029 0.033 0.038 0.018 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) 
Advertising  0.145 0.130 0.098 0.021 
 (0.092) (0.096) (0.067) (0.074) 
Size -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.010** -0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
HHI 0.041 0.050* -0.023 -0.025 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.041) (0.042) 
BIG N -0.019** -0.021** -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
MA  0.019*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
SEO  -0.019** -0.016** 0.004 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP  -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
State Fixed  Y Y Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  Y Y N N 
Year Fixed  Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed N N Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y Y Y 
N 28,547 28,547 28,547 28,547 
Adj R2 0.070 0.064 0.621 0.611 
 
This table reports results on the main effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure. The dependent 
variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and 
sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. Missing 
RD is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the amount of R&D expenditures is 
missing, and zero otherwise.  RD to sales is defined as total R&D divided by total sales. Intangibility 
is defined as intangible assets divided by total sales. Advertising is defined as total advertising 
expenditure divided by total sales. Size is defined as natural log of total assets. BIG N takes the 
value of one for a Big N auditor, and zero otherwise. HHI is the Herfindahl–Hirschman index based 
on total sales. MA takes the value of zero if there is an M&A in the following year, and zero 
otherwise. SEO takes the value of one if there is a seasoned equity offering in the following year, and 
zero otherwise. GDP is defined as GDP growth of the state. Unemployment is the unemployment rate 
of the state. The sample consists of 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses 
standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Dynamics of IDD Adoption Effect on Non-disclosure of Customer Information 
 
 Ratio1 Ratio2 
IDD Adoption-2 -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
IDD Adoption-1  -0.011 -0.025 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
IDD Adoption0 -0.022 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
IDD Adoption+1 0.020 0.025* 
 (0.016) (0.014) 
IDD Adoption2+ 0.022** 0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Other Controls Y Y 
State Fixed Y Y 
Firm  Fixed Y Y 
Year Fixed Y Y 
F: IDD-2 +IDD-1+IDD0 = 0 P-value=0.35 P-value=0.35 
F: IDD+1 + IDD2+ = 0 P-value=0.08 P-value=0.03 
N 28,547 28,547 
Adj/P  R2 0.621 0.611 
 
This table reports results on the dynamic effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure. The 
dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the 
percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, 
respectively. IDD Adoption-2. IDD Adoption -1, IDD Adoption 0, IDD Adoption+1, and IDD Adoption 2+ 
are equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that will adopt the IDD in two years, will 
adopt the IDD in one year, adopted the IDD in the current year, adopted the IDD one year ago, and 
adopted the IDD two or more years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise. IDD Rejection is an 
indicator variable set to one beginning the year when the state of the firm’s headquarters rejected 
the previously adopted IDD, and zero otherwise. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are 
included but not reported for conciseness. The sample consists of 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. 
We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed 
tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD × Entry Rate 0.007*** 0.008***     
 (0.001) (0.001)     
IDD × Stable Industry   -0.019* -0.030***   
   (0.011) (0.011)   
IDD × External Financing Dependence      -0.006*** -0.007*** 
     (0.001) (0.002) 
Other Control Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed × Year Fixed  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  
× Year Fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 27,378 27,378 28,547 28,547 28,429 28,429 
Adj R2 0.040 0.036 0.039 0.033 0.039 0.034 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure conditional on the industry-level entry rate and external 
financing dependence of a firm’s primary industry. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 
2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. Entry Rate is the 
industry-level entry rate as constructed as in Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan [2006]. External Financing Dependence of the industry is 
constructed as in Rajan and Zingales [1998]. Stable industry is an indicator that takes the value of one if the standard deviation of firm sales 
revenues within the industry during the past ten years is below the median, and zero otherwise.  The same set of control variables as in Table 
2 are included but not reported for conciseness. Since we control for state × year fixed effects, the coefficients on IDD are absorbed. Similarly, 
industry × year fixed effects absorb the coefficients on the industry level variables. Because of computational problems of including multiple 
high-dimensional fixed effects, we operationalize fixed effects through within-group transformations. This approach yields consistent 
estimators but leads to lower R-squares [Greene 2003]. The sample consists of 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses 
standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
Cross-sectional Analysis: Other Measures of Product Market Competition   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD × Abnormal ROA -0.019 -0.019*       
 (0.011) (0.010)       
IDD × Less Compete    -0.031** -0.032**     
   (0.009) (0.009)     
IDD × HHI      0.058* 0.049   
     (0.034) (0.035)   
IDD × HHI_Census       -0.233*** -0.232** 
       (0.077) (0.090) 
Other Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed× Year Fixed  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed × Year Fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster at State         
N 28,547 28,547 28,547 28,547 28,547 28,547 17,371 17,371 
Adj R2 0.039 0.033 0.040 0.034 0.039 0.033 0.021 0.019 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure conditional on the different measures of product market 
competition. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted 
percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. Abnormal ROA is defined as industry abnormal profit persistence 
(Harris [1998]). The definition of Less Compete follows Bens et al. [2011]. HHI_Census is the U.S. Census industry concentration index. The 
same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported for conciseness. . Since we control for state × year fixed effects, the 
coefficients on IDD are absorbed. Similarly, industry × year fixed effects absorb the coefficients on the industry level variables. Because of 
computational problems of including multiple high-dimensional fixed effects, we operationalize fixed effects through within-group 
transformations. This approach yields consistent estimators but leads to lower R-squares [Greene 2003]. The sample consists of maximum 
28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all 
variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Weighted Treatment Effect 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
Weighted IDD 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Missing RD 0.011 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
RD to sales -0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Intangibility  0.037 0.018 
 (0.032) (0.036) 
Advertising  0.099 0.022 
 (0.066) (0.073) 
Size -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
HHI -0.023 -0.026 
 (0.041) (0.042) 
BIG N -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
MA  0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
SEO  0.004 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP  0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  N N 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Firm Fixed Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 28,547 28,547 
Adj R2 0.621 0.611 
 
This table reports results on the effect of weighted average IDD exposure on customer identity 
disclosure. For each state in which the firm has establishments, we use the ratio of the number of 
employees in that state to total number of employee as the weight to estimate the Weighted IDD. For 
firms without detailed information on the fraction of non-headquarters employees, we assume all 
employees are working in the headquarters. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or 
Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified 
customers in the segment reporting, respectively. The sample period is 1994–2010. The same set of 
control variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported for conciseness. The sample consists of 
maximum 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are 
clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Firms with Majority of Employees at Headquarters 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD  0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Missing RD 0.013 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
RD to sales -0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Intangibility  0.030 0.016 
 (0.044) (0.050) 
Advertising  0.114 0.071 
 (0.091) (0.109) 
Size -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
HHI -0.037 -0.033 
 (0.056) (0.059) 
BIG N -0.022* -0.021* 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
MA  0.017*** 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
SEO  0.011 0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP  0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  N N 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Firm Fixed Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 19,717 19,717 
Adj R2 0.625 0.616 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure based on a subsample of 
firms with a majority of their employees working in the headquarters (i.e., the fraction of number of 
non-headquarters employees is less than 50%). For firms without detailed information on the fraction 
of non-headquarters employees, we assume all employees are working in the headquarters. The 
dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the 
percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, 
respectively. The sample period is 1994–2010. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are 
included but not reported for conciseness. The sample consists of maximum 19,717 firm-years in 1994–
2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed 
tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Adjacent State Analysis 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Missing RD 0.017* 0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
RD to sales -0.010* -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Intangibility  -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.039) (0.043) 
Advertising  0.235* 0.207 
 (0.116) (0.130) 
Size -0.018*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
HHI 0.016 0.029 
 (0.033) (0.032) 
BIG N -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.012) (0.014) 
MA  0.016 0.017* 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
SEO  -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
GDP  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Unemployment -0.001 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  Y Y 
Matched-Group Fixed Y Y 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 16,846 16,846 
Adj R2 0.077 0.071 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure based on neighboring 
states matched samples. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where 
Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in 
the segment reporting, respectively. Following the time sequence of the adoption date, for each IDD 
adopting state, we match it with neighboring non-adopting states with replacement. This procedure 
yields 13 matched groups. Each group consists of one IDD adopting state and multiple neighboring 
non-adopting states. The 13 groups are as follows: (NY:VT); (FL: AL); (DE: DC, MD); (NC: VA, SC, 
TN); (MN: ND, SD, WI); (IL: KY); (TX: NM, OK, LA); (MA: RI, NH); (IA: NE); (AR: MS); (WA: OR, 
ID); (UT: NV, CO, WY, AZ); (OH: WV). We control for the matched group fixed effects to examine the 
difference between treatment sample and control sample within each matched group. The sample 
period is 1994–2010. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported for 
conciseness. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using 
two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 9 
Removing Non-Precedent-Setting States 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.029** 0.030** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Missing RD -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
RD to sales -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Intangibility  0.065* 0.038 
 (0.036) (0.033) 
Advertising  0.086 0.024 
 (0.094) (0.099) 
Size -0.012*** -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
HHI -0.029 -0.026 
 (0.056) (0.049) 
BIG N -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
MA  0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
SEO  0.003 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
GDP  0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment -0.008** -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
State Fixed Y Y 
Firm Fixed  Y Y 
Year Fixed Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 17,537 17,537 
Adj R2 0.643 0.638 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure based on a subsample 
of firms that are headquartered in 21 states whose IDD status can be clearly identified. The 
dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the 
percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, 
respectively. The sample period is 1994–2010. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are 
included but not reported for conciseness. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are 
clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 10 
State Level Regression 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Average_Residuals_Ratio1 Average_Residuals_Ratio2 
IDD    0.113** 0.164*** 
 (0.057) (0.062) 
 
State Fixed Y Y 
Year Fixed Y Y 
N 846 846 
Adj/P  R2 0.260 0.278 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure from state level 
regressions. The dependent variable is the average residual of Ratio 1 or Ratio 2 computed from the 
following steps. First, we regress the natural log of (1 + Ratio 1 or Ratio 2) on a set of variables 
including Missing RD, RD to sale, Intangibility, Adverting, Size, HHI, Big N, SEO, MA, GDP, and 
Unemployment. Second, we estimate the residuals of the regression. Third, we calculate the mean 
value of residuals by each state-year, and define it as the dependent variable in the state level 
regressions. The sample period is 1994–2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are 
clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
The X variable is the time distance (months) to IDD adoption date. In Panel A, the Y variable is the 
percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting. In Panel B, the Y variable is the 
sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting. This measure 
captures the level of disclosure on both the customer name and related sales. We divide each side of 
the distance to IDD adoption into an optimal number of bins (i.e., min{sqrt(N), 10×ln(N)/ln(10)} 
where N is the number of observations), and each dot represents the mean value of the Y variable 
within a bin. The fitted line is based on a quadratic regression.   
 
Panel A: Percentage of unidentified customers (Ratio 1) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers (Ratio 2) 
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APPENDIX 1 
Variable Definitions. 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Ratio 1 Percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting. 
Ratio 2 Sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment 
reporting, measured by⁡
∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘 ×𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒⁡𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘
. 
Average_Residuals_R
atio1 (Ratio2) 
First, we regress the natural log of (1 + Ratio 1 or Ratio 2) on a set of 
variables including Missing RD, RD to sale, Intangibility, Adverting, Size, 
HHI, Big N, SEO, MA, GDP, and Unemployment. Second, we estimate the 
residuals of the regression. Third, we calculate the mean value of 
residuals by each state-year, and define it as the dependent variable in 
the state level regressions. 
IDD Equal to 1 for the post-adoption period and 0 otherwise.  
IDD Adoption-2 Equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a state that will adopt the IDD 
in two years, and 0 otherwise. 
 
IDD Adoption-1 Equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a state that will adopt the IDD 
in one year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
IDD Adoption0 Equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a state that adopted the IDD in 
the current year, and 0 otherwise. 
IDD Adoption+1 Equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a state that adopted the IDD 
one year ago, and 0 otherwise. 
IDD Adoption2+ Equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in a state that adopted the IDD 
two or more years ago, and 0 otherwise.  
IDD Rejection An indicator variable set to one beginning the year when the state of the 
firm’s headquarters rejected the previously adopted IDD, and zero 
otherwise. 
Weighted IDD Employees-weighted IDD of each firm, measured by 
∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝑠 ×𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑡
∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
𝑠
,where Employeess,i,t is the total number of employees of 
firm i in state s in year t.  
Intangibility Intangible assets divided by total sales. 
Advertising Total advertising expenditure divided by total sales.  
Size Natural log of total assets. 
Abnormal ROA Harris’s (1998) measure of industry abnormal profit persistence.  
BIG N Equal to 1 for Big N auditor and 0 otherwise. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on total sales.  
Missing RD Equal to 1 if R&D is missing, and 0 otherwise.  
RD Total R&D divided by total sales. 
External Financing 
Dependence  
Following Rajan and Zingales [1998], we compute this as capital 
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital 
expenditures. Then, we define the industry median value as the industry 
level of external financing dependence.  
Entry Rate Industry level entry rate constructed as in Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 
[2006].   
Less Compete  Equal to 1 if the industry competition is low, and 0 otherwise. We use the 
sales-weighted total capital expenditures for an industry to measure the 
barriers to entry, and the price cost margin to measure the product 
sustainability. Higher values of the entry barrier combined with lower 
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values of the product substitutability ratio indicate lower levels of 
competition. 
Stable industry An indicator that takes the value of one if the standard deviation of firm 
sales revenues within the industry during the past ten years is below the 
median, and zero otherwise. 
HHI_Census U.S. Census-based industry concentration (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung [2014]). 
MA Equal to 1 if there is an M&A in the following year, and 0 otherwise.  
SEO Equal to 1 if there is a seasoned equity offering in the following year, and 
0 otherwise. 
GDP GDP growth of the state.  
Unemployment  Unemployment rate of the state. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Precedent-Setting Legal Cases Adopting or Rejecting the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
 
State Precedent-Setting Cases Date Decision 
AR Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Ark. 1997)   3/18/1997 Adopt 
CT Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996)   2/28/1996 Adopt 
DE 
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 
1964) 5/5/1964 Adopt 
FL Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 7/11/1960 Adopt 
FL Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co. Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 5/21/2001 Reject 
GA Essex Group Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1998) 6/29/1998 Adopt 
IL Teradyne Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 111. 1989) 2/9/1989 Adopt 
IN Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995) 7/12/1995 Adopt 
IA Uncle B’s Bakery v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996) 4/1/1996 Adopt 
KS Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-duCros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2006) 2/2/2006 Adopt 
MA Bard v. Intoccia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15368 (D. Mass. 1994) 10/13/1994 Adopt 
MI 
Allis-Chalmers Manuf. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 
1966)  2/17/1966 Adopt 
MI CMI Int’l, Inc. v. Intermet Int’l Corp., 649 N.W.2d 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) 4/30/2002 Reject 
MN Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986) 10/10/1986 Adopt 
MO H&R Block Eastern Tax Servs. Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000) 11/2/2000 Adopt 
NJ Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) 4/27/1987 Adopt 
NY Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 556 (N.Y.A.D. 1919) 12/5/1919 Adopt 
NC Travenol Laboratories Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) 6/17/1976 Adopt 
OH Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) 9/29/2000 Adopt 
PA Air Products & Chemical Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 2/19/1982 Adopt 
TX Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App. 1993) 5/28/1993 Adopt 
TX Cardinal Health Staffing Network Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App. 2003) 4/3/2003 Reject 
UT Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (Utah D.C. 1998) 1/30/1998 Adopt 
WA Solutec Corp. Inc. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067  (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) 12/30/1997 Adopt 
This appendix is a replication of Table 1 in Klasa et al. (2017).
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APPENDIX 3 
Determinants of the IDD 
 
 (1) (2) 
 IDD Adoption IDD Rejection 
Political balance  1.869* -1.712*** 
 (1.025) (0.598) 
Total size of listed firms -0.432* -0.150 
 (0.254) (0.576) 
Total number of listed firms -0.648 1.999** 
 (0.946) (0.875) 
GDP  0.126** -0.059 
 (0.056) (0.090) 
Unemployment 0.279 0.847*** 
 (0.407) (0.282) 
State Fixed Y N 
Year Fixed Y Y 
N 238 140 
Adj/P  R2 0.352 0.494 
 
This table reports results on the determinants of IDD adoption (rejection). The dependent variable in 
Column 1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a state-year that adopted IDD, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Column 2 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one for a state-year that rejected IDD, and zero otherwise. Political Imbalance is defined as the 
fraction of Democratic Party Members in a state’s congress. Total size of listed firms is defined as the 
natural log of the total assets of all listed companies headquartered in the state. Total number of 
listed firms is defined as the natural log of (1+ the total number of all listed companies 
headquartered in the state).  The sample period is 1977–2013. We report in parentheses standard 
errors that are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all 
variable definitions. 
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TABLE OA1 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: HHI Based on Census Data 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.026** 0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Missing RD 0.016 0.021 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
RD to sales -0.010*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Intangibility  0.036 0.039 
 (0.048) (0.052) 
Advertising  0.180* 0.201* 
 (0.103) (0.117) 
Size -0.020*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
HHI_Census -0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI_Census Missing 0.001 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
BIG N -0.029** -0.027* 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
MA 0.017* 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
SEO -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
GDP -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment -0.000 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
State Fixed  Yes Yes 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Cluster at State Yes Yes 
N 17,371 1,7371 
Adj R2 0.064 0.056 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure using the U.S. 
consensus-based industry concentration measure, HHI_Census (Ali, Klasa, and Yeung [2014]). The 
dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the 
percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, 
respectively. If HHI_Census is missing, then we set it to the sample median value. HHI_Census 
Missing is equal to 1 if HHI_Census is missing, and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of 17,371 
manufacturing firms in years of 1997, 2002 and 2007 with non-missing census-based concentration 
values. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed 
tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE OA2 
Dynamics of IDD Adoption/Rejection Effect: Restrict the Event Window to [-2, 2] 
 
Panel A: Adoption (base year is year 0) 
 Ratio1 Ratio2 
IDD Adoption-2 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.030) 
IDD Adoption-1  -0.010 0.004 
 (0.025) (0.029) 
IDD Adoption+1 0.017 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.034) 
IDD Adoption+2 0.077*** 0.065** 
 (0.023) (0.027) 
Other Controls Y Y 
State Fixed Y Y 
Firm  Fixed Y Y 
Year Fixed Y Y 
Group Fixed Y Y 
N 2,744 2,744 
Adj/P  R2 0.714 0.687 
 
This table reports results on the dynamic effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure within a [-2, 
2] event window around the IDD adoption year. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 
or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of 
unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. IDD Adoption-2. IDD Adoption-1, 
IDDAdoption+1, and IDD Adoption+2 are equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that will 
adopt the IDD in two years, will adopt the IDD in one year, adopted the IDD one year ago, and 
adopted the IDD two years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise. We employ a matched sample 
regression since different states adopted IDD in different year. For each IDD adopting state, we 
match it with all neighboring non-adopting states with replacement. For example, state Indiana (IN) 
adopted IDD in 7/12/1995. The event window would then be fiscal years 1993 to 1997. We match 
observations located in IN with those in KY and MI for fiscal years 1993 to1997. Note that OH and 
IL are also the neighboring states of IN. However, since these two states are also the IDD adopting 
states, we exclude observations in these two neighboring states from the control sample. The 
matching follows the sequence of the adoption date and is done with replacement. We thus can avoid 
the multiple-counting problem.The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not 
reported for conciseness. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, 
and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
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Panel B: Rejection (base year is year 0) 
 Ratio1 Ratio2 Ratio1 Ratio2 
IDD Rejection-2 0.009 0.012 0.062 0.068 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.041) 
IDD Rejection-1  -0.004 -0.004 0.011 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) 
IDD Rejection+1 -0.008 -0.005 0.052 0.059 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.051) (0.055) 
IDD Rejection+2 -0.014 -0.015 0.060 0.052 
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.064) (0.071) 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Y Y Y Y 
Firm  Fixed Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed N N Y Y 
Group Fixed Y Y Y Y 
N 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 
Adj/P  R2 0.748 0.771 0.748 0.771 
 
This table reports results on the dynamic effect of IDD rejection on customer identity disclosure 
within a [-2, 2] event window around the IDD rejection year. The dependent variable is natural log of 
(1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage 
of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. IDD Rejection-2. IDD Rejection-1, 
IDD Rejection+1, and IDD Rejection+2 are equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a state that will 
reject the IDD in two years, will reject the IDD in one year, rejected the IDD one year ago, and 
rejected the IDD two years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise. We employ a matched sample 
regression since different states rejected IDD in different years. For each IDD rejection state, we 
match it with all neighboring IDD adopting states with replacement. For example, state Texas (TX) 
rejected IDD in 4/3/2003. The event window would then be fiscal years 2000 to 2004. We match 
observations located in TX with those in AR for fiscal years 2000 to 2004. Note that OK, NM and LA 
are also the neighboring states of TX. However, since these three states are states without any IDD 
cases, we thus exclude observations in these neighboring states from the control sample. Note that 
our inferences are unaltered if we include the observations in these three states. The matching 
follows the sequence of the adoption date and is done with replacement. The same set of control 
variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported for conciseness. We report in parentheses 
standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 
1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE OA3 
Cross-sectional Analysis: Other Measures of Capital Market Benefits   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ratio1 Ratio1 Ratio1 Ratio1 Ratio2 Ratio2 Ratio2 Ratio2 
IDD × Equity Financing 0.001    0.001    
 (0.001)    (0.001)    
IDD × Debt Financing  -0.012**    -0.013**   
  (0.006)    (0.006)   
IDD × Institutional Ownership   0.000    0.000  
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
IDD × Analyst    0.006    0.007 
    (0.005)    (0.004) 
Other Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed × Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit-Industry Fixed × Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster at State         
N 25,040 26,942 18,736 16,919 25,040 26,942 18,736 16,919 
Adj R2 0.039 0.038 0.044 0.043 0.035 0.033 0.039 0.036 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure conditional on other measures of capital market benefits. The 
dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of 
unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. Equity Financing is net equity financing measured as the proceeds from the 
sale of common and preferred stock less cash payments for the purchase of common and preferred stock less cash payments for dividends. 
Debt Financing is net debt financing measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt less cash payments for long-term 
debt reductions less the net changes in current debt. Institutional Ownership is the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Analyst 
is the number of analysts covering the firm. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported for conciseness. The 
sample consists of maximum 26,942 firm-years in 1994–2010. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not reported 
for conciseness. Since we control for state × year fixed effects, the coefficients on IDD are absorbed. Similarly, industry × year fixed effects 
absorb the coefficients on the industry level variables. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 
1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE OA4 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Controlling for More State Level Variables 
 
 (1) (2)  
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2  
IDD 0.021*** 0.023***  
 (0.006) (0.007)  
Missing RD 0.024*** 0.031***  
 (0.008) (0.009)  
RD to sales -0.010*** -0.009***  
 (0.003) (0.003)  
Intangibility  0.029 0.033  
 (0.030) (0.029)  
Advertising  0.141 0.126  
 (0.092) (0.096)  
Size -0.018*** -0.015***  
 (0.002) (0.002)  
HHI 0.041 0.050*  
 (0.028) (0.027)  
BIG N -0.019** -0.022**  
 (0.008) (0.009)  
MA  0.019*** 0.018***  
 (0.007) (0.006)  
SEO  -0.019** -0.016**  
 (0.009) (0.008)  
GDP  -0.000 -0.000  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Unemployment 0.001 0.004  
 (0.003) (0.003)  
Political Imbalance -0.008 -0.004  
 (0.010) (0.011)  
Total size of listed firms 0.002 -0.002  
 (0.006) (0.006)  
Total number of listed firms -0.025 -0.027  
 (0.017) (0.017)  
State Fixed  Y Y  
2-digit-Industry Fixed  N N  
Year Fixed  Y Y  
Firm Fixed Y Y  
Cluster at State Y Y  
N 28,547 28,547  
Adj R2 0.070 0.064  
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure with additional 
controls of state level variables. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), 
where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified 
customers in the segment reporting, respectively. Political Imbalance is defined as the fraction of 
Democratic Party Members in a state’s congress. Total size of listed firms is defined as natural log of 
the total assets of all listed companies headquartered in the state. Total number of listed firms is 
defined as natural log of (1+ the total number of all listed companies headquartered in the state). 
The sample consists of 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, 
which are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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TABLE OA5 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Compustat Sample 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.019** 0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
UTSA 0.004 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Missing RD 0.019* 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
RD to sales 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Intangibility  0.076*** 0.069*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
Advertising  0.222*** 0.263*** 
 (0.073) (0.084) 
Size -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
HHI -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
BIG N -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
MA  0.007 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
SEO  0.003 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP  0.024 0.033 
 (0.088) (0.085) 
Unemployment -0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
Firm-Fixed  Y Y 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 45,018 45,018 
Adj R2 0.574 0.572 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure, based on a sample of 
Compustat firms. The dependent variable is natural log of (1 + Ratio 1 or Ratio 2). UTSA is defined 
as 1 if the headquarters state adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and zero otherwise. The 
sample consists of 45,018 firm-years in 1977–2013. We report in parentheses standard errors, which 
are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable 
definitions. 
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TABLE OA6 
Small Business Reporting Sample 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio 1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.038** 0.045*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
Missing RD 0.035** 0.036** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
RD to sales 0.002 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Intangibility  0.041 0.051 
 (0.057) (0.056) 
Advertising  0.140 0.111 
 (0.094) (0.092) 
Size -0.016** -0.014** 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
HHI -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.077) (0.077) 
BIG N -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
MA  0.031*** 0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
SEO  -0.010 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
GDP  0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Unemployment 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  N N 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Firm Fixed Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 12,340 12,340 
Adj R2 0.091 0.081 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure, based on a subsample 
of small business reporting firms. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), 
where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified 
customers in the segment reporting, respectively. For fiscal years prior to 2008, SMB takes the value 
of 1 if the market value of the observation is less than $25 million, or total sales is less than $25 
million. For fiscal years after 2008, SMB takes the value of one if the market value of the 
observation is less than 75 million or total sales is less than 50 million. Market value is based on the 
second quarter-end market value of the firm. If market value is missing, we replace it with the last 
available value. The sample consists of 12,340 firm-years in 1994–2010. We report in parentheses 
standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix 
1 for all variable definitions. 
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TABLE OA7 
IDD and Non-disclosure of Customer Information: Controlling for Leverage 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Ratio1 Ratio 2 
IDD 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Market Leverage 0.065*** 0.081*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Missing RD 0.022** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
RD to sales -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Intangibility  0.015 0.010 
 (0.031) (0.032) 
Advertising  0.174** 0.177** 
 (0.085) (0.086) 
Size -0.019*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
HHI 0.039 0.050* 
 (0.028) (0.026) 
BIG N -0.018** -0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
MA 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
SEO -0.020** -0.016** 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
GDP -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 0.002 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
State Fixed  Yes Yes 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes 
Cluster at State Yes Yes 
N 27,340 27,340 
Adj R2 0.069 0.064 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure, controlling for market 
leverage. The dependent variable is natural log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 
are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment 
reporting, respectively. Market leverage is the book value of long-term debt (dltt) plus debt in current 
liabilities (dlc), divided by market value of assets (prcc_f*csho + at – ceq). The sample period is 1994–
2010. We report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed 
tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions. 
. 
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TABLE OA8 
IDD and Capital Structure: Controlling for Disclosure of Customer Information 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Market leverage Market leverage Market leverage 
IDD   0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ratio1  0.020***  
  (0.004)  
Ratio2   0.022*** 
   (0.004) 
RD -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
PPE 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex -0.359*** -0.358*** -0.358*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
MB -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
OROA -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.080*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
DIV -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ind_Vol 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_leverage 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State Fixed  Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit-Industry Fixed  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster at State Yes Yes Yes 
N 27,149 27,149 27,149 
Adj R2 0.333 0.334 0.335 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on capital structure, controlling for customer identity 
disclosure. The dependent variable is Market Leverage, which is the book value of long-term debt 
(dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (dlc), divided by market value of assets (prcc_f*csho + at – ceq). 
The sample period is 1994–2010. PPE is defined as the net PPE divided by total assets (ppent/at). 
Capex is defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets (capx/at). MB is defined as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. OROA measures the profitability of 
the firm and is defined as oibdp/at. DIV is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm 
pays dividends, and zero otherwise. Ind_Vol is defined as the standard deviation of firm profitability 
within an industry. Ind_leverage is defined as the industry median level of market leverage.  We 
report in parentheses standard errors, which are clustered within state, and are robust to 
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heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 using two-tailed 
tests, respectively. See Appendix 1 for other variable definitions. 
. 
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TABLE OA9 
IDD Adoption and Segment Reporting Aggregation  
 
 Pseudo Segments Pseudo Segments 
IDD 0.024* 0.021* 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Missing RD -0.012 -0.041* 
 (0.020) (0.022) 
RD to sales 0.010 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Intangibility  0.081 0.035 
 (0.055) (0.056) 
Advertising  0.106 -0.103 
 (0.182) (0.138) 
Size -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
BIG N 0.297*** 0.299*** 
 (0.061) (0.069) 
HHI -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.019) 
MA  0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
SEO  0.056*** 0.062*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
GDP  0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
State Fixed  Y Y 
2-digit Industry Fixed  N Y 
Year Fixed  Y Y 
Cluster at State Y Y 
N 28,547 28,547 
 
This table reports results on the effect of IDD on segment reporting aggregation. The discretionary 
aggregation of segment information is measured by a comparison of reported segments in Compustat 
and those “pseudo-segments” inferred from the plant-level data in NETS (similar to the method of 
Bens, Berger, and Monahan, 2011). Specifically, we group a firm’s plants that share the same four-
digit SIC code into a “pseudo-segment” and determine whether its SIC code matches the primary or 
secondary SIC code of one of the firm’s line-of-business segments per Compustat. Pseudo Segments is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is “pseudo segment” that is not reported as 
an external segment, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 28,547 firm-years in 1994–2010.We 
report in parentheses standard errors that are clustered within state, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tailed tests, 
respectively. See Appendix 1 for all variable definitions.   
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Figure OA1 
Dynamics of IDD Adoption Effect on Non-disclosure of Customer Information 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the evolution of IDD adoption effect on disclosure of customer information around 
the adoption year. The y axis presents the magnitude of the effect of IDD adoption (together with 
90% confidence interval) on disclosure of customer information, which is measured by natural log of 
(1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the percentage and sales-weighted percentage 
of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, respectively. These magnitudes are estimated 
based on the specifications in Table 3. Year-2, Year -1, Year 0, Year 1 and Year 2+ are the two years 
before the adopting year, one year before the adopting year, current adopting year, one year after the 
adopting year, and two or more years after the adopting year, respectively.  
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Figure OA2 
Random Assignments of Adoption Dates for Treatment States 
  
 
This figure reports results on the effect of IDD on customer identity disclosure based on pseudo-
treatment and control samples. We generate pseudo-IDD adoption dates for all states using the 
following method. For each adopting state, we randomly draw an IDD-adopting year from 1994 to 
2010 with a restriction that the percentage of pseudo-IDD adoption firm-years is the same as that of 
actual IDD adoption firm-years (i.e., 50%). Then, using these pseudo-IDD adoption dates, we re-
estimate our baseline regression on log of (1+ Ratio 1 or Ratio 2), where Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are the 
percentage and sales-weighted percentage of unidentified customers in the segment reporting, 
respectively. We repeat this exercise 1,000 times and obtain the distribution of the pseudo 
coefficients from the regressions. We then plot the distribution of pseudo coefficients. The red lines in 
the graphes represent the regression coefficients obtained using the actual IDD adoption dates. 
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